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REFUTING THE "CLASSIC" PROPERTY
CLAUSE THEORY
EUGENE R. GAETKEt
In a series of cases the Supreme Court has recognized broad, pre-
emptive federal regulatory power over federally owned land. The Court
has based these decisions on the combined effect of the property and
supremacy clauses of the Constitution. The scope of this power has been
the cause of a heated political and legal debate in western states, which
contain extensive federal land holdings. A number of legal commenta-
tors have argued that the Court's broad construction of the property
clause is a misinterpretation of the Framers' intent and that the clause
merely grants the federal government proprietary rights over its land
holdings. As support for this contention, these commentators cite the
land policies of the British colonial administration, the land claims of
the states during and immediately after the American Revolution, the
public land debates during the drafting and ratification of the Constitu-
tion, and the early decisions of the Supreme Court on public land mat-
ters. Professor Gaetke reexamines these early precedents and argues
that they support rather than refute the Court's current broad construc-
tion of the property clause. He concludes that the modern construction
is not a break with precedent, but is the continuation of long-settled
doctrine.
The relationship of federal and state governments to federally owned lands
is of fundamental importance to the structure of our federal system.' Indeed,
one of the primary reasons for the 1787 Constitutional Convention was the need
to remedy the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation in respect to the
disposition of the unsettled lands lying to the west of the thirteen original
states.2 Nevertheless, nearly two hundred years after ratification of the Consti-
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1974, University of
Minnesota. The author wishes to express his appreciation for support given his research by the
University of Kentucky College of Law Fund. A considerable portion of this Article was completed
while the author was a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at Indiana-Bloomington School of Law.
1. Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories and the States in Land-
holding, 28 TEx. L. REv. 43, 43 (1949) ("[The landholding relation] is one of the most basic founda-
tions of our federalism, if, indeed, it is not the corner stone."); see also P. GATES, HisroRy OF
PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 57 (1968 & photo. reprint 1979) (asserting that "the use of the
public lands was to be a vital nationalizing factor in American development"); Sax, Helpless Giants:
The National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239, 254 (1976) ("Every
expansion of the property clause increases the power of the federal government at the expense of the
states' authority, and by the traditional jurisprudence of federalism that is cause for unease.").
2. P. GATES, supra note 1, at 3, 73; E. SCOTT, U.S. CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION 1787, at
33 (1893); Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues Surrounding Federal
Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 PAC. L.J. 693, 696 (1981); Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, The
Consititution and the Continental Shelf, 26 TEX. L. REV. 398, 416 (1948); Patterson, supra note 1, at
52-53; Tallman, The Public Domain, 20 TEX. L. REv. 55, 55 (1942). For further discussion of these
historical developments, see infra text accompanying notes 45-54, 83-107.
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tution, the respective powers of the states and the federal government over fed-
eral lands remain controversial. 3
3. Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of the Sage-
brush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847, 848 (1982); Coggins, Evans & Lindberg-Johnson, The Law of
Public Rangeland Management 1: The Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535,
567 (1982); Haslam, Federal and State Cooperation in the Management of Public Lands, 5 J. CON-
TaMP. L. 149, 149-50 (1978); Sax, Why We Will Not (Should Not) Sell the Public Lands: Changing
Conceptions of Private Property, 1983 UTAH L. REv. 313, 313-14; Shephard, The Scope of Congress'
Constitutional Power Under the Property Clause" Regulating Non-federal Power to Further the Pur-
poses of National Parks and Wilderness Areas, 11 ENVTL. AF. L. REv. 479, 485 (1984); Note,
Federal Lands: Energy, Environment and the States, 7 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 213, 215 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as Note, Federal Lands]; Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing
Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. Rnv. 817, 817, 819 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Property Power];
Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 505,
505 [hereinafter cited as Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion].
The current controversy regarding federal lands extends beyond the courts and scholarly jour-
nals to a popular movement dubbed the "Sagebrush Rebellion." The movement seeks increased
state ownership of, or at least greater state management powers over, federal lands. Babbitt, supra,
at 849-57; Brodie, supra note 2, at 694; Coggins, Evans & Lindberg-Johnson, supra, at 572-77;
Leshy, Unravelling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal Lands, 14 U.C.D. L. REv.
317 (1980); Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion, supra, at 505. Several western states have enacted legis-
lation purportedly asserting state ownership of unappropriated federal lands within their boundaries.
See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 321.5971 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 65-11-4 (Supp. 1981). This
legislation has been referred to by other interested parties as "The Great Terrain Robbery." Cog-
gins, Evans & Lindberg-Johnson, supra, at 575 n.263.
Such sentiments among the states, however, are not new. During the nineteenth century, as
new states were admitted to the Union, several of these states noted their objection to continued
federal landholdings within their boundaries. P. GATEs, supra note 1, at 9, 30; Patterson, supra note
1, at 69-71. Conversely, some of the 13 original states frequently objected to the federal govern-
ment's preferential treatment of new states through vast federal land grants on their admission to the
Union. P. GATES, supra note 1, at 5-7.
The dispute regarding federal landholdings intensified during the 1930s when the federal gov-
ernment asserted jurisdiction over certain submerged lands that the coastal states had assumed were
state property. Hardwicke, Iig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 400-08. In United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19 (1947), the Supreme Court upheld the federal government's position. The matter was
reargued strenuously in a series of articles in the Texas Law Review. See Clark, National Sovereignty
and Dominion Over Lands Underlying the Ocean, 27 TEx. L. REv. 140 (1948); Hardwicke, Illig &
Patterson, supra note 2; Patterson, supra note 1. Federal control of submerged lands remains con-
troversial. See Ball, Good Old American Permits Madisonian Federalism on the Territorial Sea and
Continental Shelf, 12 ENVrL. L. 625 (1982).
Recently, the dispute has centered on congressional policies for the retention of federal owner-
ship of public lands, Brodie, supra note 2, at 694, as well as congressional regulation of wildlife on
federal lands, see, eg., Kieppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), and regulation of recreational
use of state-owned waters bordered by federal lands, see, eg., Minnesota v. United States, 660 F.2d
1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977). For a discussion of the latter use of the property clause
power, see Gaetke, The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978: Regulating
Nonfederal Property Under the Property Clause, 60 OR. L. REv. 157 (1981).
The stakes involved in the control of federal lands are high. See Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion,
supra, at 510. The federal lands are said to contain 84.9% of the nation's oil reserves, 72% of its oil
shale reserves, 37.4% of its natural gas reserves, 50% of its geothermal energy reserves, 3.7% of its
coal reserves, and 37.4% of its uranium ore reserves. Id. at 511. Therefore, in matters of energy
regulation, broad, preemptive federal property clause legislation effectively could displace state regu-
lation of considerable natural resources. Such legislation may have a particularly significant effect
on state regulation of oil reserves. A federal program that permits heavy drilling on federal lands
might deplete a common source of supply shared with wells on neighboring nonfederal property.
Thus, a federal program could largely displace a state's restrictions even on private property. Note,
Federal Lands, supra, at 225.
Although federal land issues remain controversial, they do not preoccupy Congress as they once
did. In 1830, for example, Senator Robert Y. Hayne noted:
More than half our time has been taken up with the discussion of propositions connected
with the public lands; more than half of our acts embrace provisions growing out of this
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Views about the extent of congressional power under the property clause4
to dispose of and regulate federal lands persistently range to the extremes. 5 The
Supreme Court recently has viewed the power broadly,6 declaring it not only to
be "without limitations,"' 7 but also to be preemptive of state legislation when
exercised.8 Critics of that broad view9 perceive the Court's approach to be a
break with the Framers' intent 10 and established precedent." The "classic"
fruitful source. Day after day the charges are rung on this topic, from the grave inquiry
into the right of the new States to the absolute sovereignty and property in the soil, down
to the grant of a pre-emption of a few quarter sections to actual settlers .... A question
that is pressed upon us in so many ways; that intrudes in such a variety of shapes; involving
so deeply the feelings and interests of a large portion of the Union; insinuating itself into
almost every question of public policy, and tinging the whole course of our legislation,
cannot be put aside or laid asleep.
CONG. DEB. 31-32 (1830) (statement of Sen. Hayne).
4. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The property clause provides:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in
this Constitution shall be so constructed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or
of any particular State.
Id.
5. Congress also has power over certain federal lands under article I. It empowers Congress:
[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceed-
ing ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Con-
gress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other
needful Buildings ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
This provision pertains to a narrow category of federal property known as "federal enclaves."
Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 AIZ. L. REv. 283, 288-90 & n.17
(1976). Federal enclaves are those federal lands over which a state has consented to the exercise of
federal legislative authority that are used for the erection of "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-
Yards, and other needful Buildings." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; see Paul v. United States, 371
U.S. 245, 264 (1963); Kohi v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875); infra text accompanying notes
91-95, 108-24. For a brief discussion of congressional authority under this clause, see Note, The
Property Power, supra note 3, at 817, 820 & n.25. Federal property that does not meet the two
requirements of article I falls under the general article IV authority of Congress over federal prop-
erty. The meaning of the article I power over federal enclaves is important toward understanding
the meaning of the article IV property clause power of Congress, the subject of this Article. See
infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
6. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
7. Id. at 539. The Supreme Court's assertion that the property clause power of Congress is
"without limitations" is critically examined in Gaetke, Congressional Discretion Under the Property
Clause, 33 HASTINGS L. J. 381 (1981). For further discussion of the limits of the property clause
power, see infra text accompanying notes 260-63.
8. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976) ("Absent consent or cession a State un-
doubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely
retains power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. And when
Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the
Supremacy Clause.").
9. See, eg., Brodie, supra note 2, at 699-715; Engdahl, supra note 5, at 367-71; Engdahl, Some
Observations on State and Federal Control of Natural Resources, 15 Hous. L. REv. 1201, 1208-11
(1978); Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion, supra note 3, at 530; Note, The Property Power, supra note 3,
at 822-25.
10. See Hardwicke, Ifig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 423-24, 429-31.
11. See Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918);
Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896); Fort Leavenworth
R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
1985]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
property clause theory,12 the critics assert, correctly limits the role of Congress
regarding federal lands, with certain exceptions, to that of a mere proprietor; 13 it
recognizes no preemptive capability in property clause legislation. 14 Indeed, the
most extreme "classic theorists" 15 maintain that the federal government has no
constitutional authority under the property clause even to retain ownership of
lands within the states. 16
Substantively, the scholarly dialogue generated by the controversy has been
unfortunately one-sided. The classic theorists have presented their legal argu-
ments cogently, often in painstaking detail. 17 Opposing commentators, urging
the correctness of the Supreme Court's broad view, 18 however, usually assume
the validity of the Court's current position 19 and applaud its policy applications
and implications, 20 rather than refute the specific contentions of the classic theo-
rists. Almost no effort has been expended by those supporting the Court's broad
view to reconcile that view with the Framers' intent and the early case law. 21
This Article is the result of such an effort. It asserts that the Court's cur-
rent, expansive view of the property clause power is consistent with and sup-
ported by the documented intentions of the Framers and the early Supreme
Court decisions interpreting that power. Indeed, the broad view of that power
has been the true "classic" property clause theory all along.
I. THE CLASSIC PROPERTY CLAUSE THEORY
Two alternative contentions, one more extreme than the other, collectively
12. The term "classic theory" is taken from Engdahl, supra note 5, at 296. It is used through-
out this Article to identify the restrictive view of the property clause generally described in the text
accompanying notes 22-33.
13. See Brodie, supra note 2, at 710-11; Engdahl, supra note 5, at 296-300; Engdahl, supra note
9, at 1209-10; Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 79-80
n.120 (1973); Note, The Property Power, supra note 3, at 820-25, 835-37; infra text accompanying
notes 24-33, 167-73.
14. See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 303-04, 309-10; Engdahl, supra note 13, at 79 n.120; Note The
Property Power, supra note 3, at 822-23.
15. The term "classic theorists" is used throughout this Article to identify generally those com-
mentators who have urged all or part of the restrictive view of the property clause power. The term
is not intended to assert or imply that each commentator has embraced all of the components of that
restrictive view.
16. See Brodie, supra note 2, at 721-22; Patterson, supra note 1, at 60, 71; infra text accompany-
ing notes 22-23. According to these classic theorists, article I federal enclaves are the only appropri-
ate federal landholdings within the states.
17. The article most notable for its detail is Engdahl, supra note 5.
18. See, eg., Coggins & Hensley, Constitutional Limits on Federal Power to Protect and Manage
Wildlife: Is the Endangered Species Act Endangered?, 61 IOWA L. REV. 1099, 1135-39 (1976); Has-
lam, supra note 3, at 151-54; Sax, supra note 1, at 252-53; Soper, The Constitutional Framework of
Environmental Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 20, 31 (Dolgin & Guilbert ed. 1974);
Note, Constitutionality of the Free Roaming Wild Horses and Burros Act: The Ecosystem and the
Property Clause in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 7 ENVTL. L. 137 (1976).
19. See, eg., Coggins & Hensley, supra note 18, at 1135-36; Sax, supra note 1, at 245-46, 252-
53; Note, Federal Lands, supra note 3, at 216-17; Note, supra note 18, at 147-48.
20. See Coggins & Hensley, supra note 18, at 1138-39; Sax, supra note 1, at 252-55; Note, supra
note 18, at 150-51; Note, Expansion of National Power Under the Property Clause: Federal Regula-
tion of Wildlife, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 181, 192 (1977).
21. One exception, though somewhat abbreviated in its treatment of this particular subject, is
Coggins, Evans & Lindberg-Johnson, supra note 3, at 570-72, 574-75, 594-95.
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can be labeled the classic property clause theory. Both contentions may startle
those accustomed to an expansive view of federal power. The first and more
extreme contention offered by some classic theorists is that the property clause
does not authorize federal retention of title to public lands within the boundaries
of states.22 According to these classic theorists, the article IV power of Congress
applies only prior to the admission to the Union of the states in which the public
lands lie. On admission of the state, the Constitution requires that all such lands
must be transferred to state or private ownership. 23
Even if federal retention of title to lands within the states under article IV is
recognized as constitutional, the classic theory's second contention24 asserts that
under the property clause, Congress has only those powers over federal lands
that any proprietor has over private property. 25 Since the property clause grants
only proprietary powers to Congress, according to this contention the states nec-
essarily possess the same general governmental jurisdiction over the federal
lands within their respective boundaries as they possess over the private prop-
erty located there.26 Consequently, like other proprietors, Congress can have its
22. See, eg., Brodie, supra note 2, at 694, 718-23; Engdahl, supra note 5, at 292-93; Hardwicke,
Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 431; Patterson, supra note 1, at 58, 60,71. The only constitutional
federal ownership of lands within states, according to this contention, is by purchase with consent of
the state for purposes of "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings"
under the article I clause. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17; see Patterson, supra note 1, at 71, 72-73.
23. Brodie, supra note 2, at 721-22; Patterson, supra note 1, at 72-73. This argument is a funda-
mental tenet of the Sagebrush Rebellion. See Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion, supra note 3. Under
this contention, most of the federal government's current ownership of land is unconstitutional. By
definition, those federal lands that do not qualify as article I lands are necessarily article IV lands.
See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 290 n.19. The article I lands (approximately 6 million acres) constitute
less than 1% of the total federal landholdings (approximately 755 million acres). See PUB. LAND L.
REV. COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATiON's LAND 277, 327 (1970). Thus, more than 99% of
federal lands qualify as article IV lands. According to these more extreme classic theorists, the
national parks, forests, wilderness areas, wildlife refuges, and so on, are unconstitutional article IV
lands.
24. The most elaborate scholarly statement of this aspect of the classic property clause theory is
made by Professor Engdahl. Professor Engdahl, in contrast to the classic theorists who adhere to
the first contention discussed above, recognizes that the federal retention of ownership of article IV
lands within the states is constitutional. Engdahl, supra note 5, at 366.
25. Brodie, supra note 2, at 710-11; Engdahl, supra note 5, at 294, 296; Engdahl, supra note 13,
at 79 n.120.
Thus, Congress may decide whether and on what terms to dispose of the federal lands. See
Gaetke, supra note 7, at 384-86. Like any proprietor, Congress also may control the use of the
federal lands. For a discussion of various statutory restrictions on the use of federal lands, see
Gaetke, supra note 7, at 387-90, 391-95; Muys, The Federal Lands, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw 492, 520-31 (Dolgin & Guilbert ed. 1974).
To protect federal lands from harm, however, Congress, unlike a private proprietor, may use its
legislative authority to prohibit certain conduct. See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 306-10; Note, Federal
Lands, supra note 3, at 821. For example, grazing livestock on federal lands without a permit is
prohibited by the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315v (1982). Such legislation may
be enforced through criminal sanctions. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). Private
proprietors must rely on various common-law theories to protect their property from the conduct of
others. The federal government also may choose to rely on those common-law causes of action to
prevent harm to the federal lands rather than enact legislation. "As an owner of property in almost
every State of the Union, [the federal government has] the same right to have it protected by the
local laws that other persons have." Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231 (1851)
(trespass action); see also United States v. Gear, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 120 (1845) (waste).
26. Engdahl, supra note 5, at 296; Engdahl, supra note 13, at 79 n.120.
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wishes as a landowner overriden by contrary state law. 27 Thus, federal property
clause legislation generally must yield to conflicting state law.2 8 There are, how-
ever, two exceptions to this rather remarkable tenet of the classic theory.
29
First, in matters pertaining to the acquisition of title to federal land,30 congres-
sional legislation controls. 31 Second, when Congress acts to protect federal
lands from harm, conflicting state legislation is precluded. 32 Only in these two
situations, however, do property clause enactments of Congress have preemptive
effect under the classic theory.
Thus, even in its more generous form, the classic theory does not treat the
property clause as a grant of governmental power at all.33 The theory largely
views the clause as merely designating which branch of the federal government
should act as "owner" of federal lands in disposing of them and controlling their
use.
II. THE DEFECTiVE FOUNDATION OF THE CLASSIC THEORY
The classic property clause theory is premised on certain assertions regard-
27, See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 309-10.
28. Id. at 296-97, 316 n.150, 341. This proposition is the most startling contention of the clas-
sic theory, at least to those accustomed to an expansive view of federal powers.
29. The classic theorists also recognize that when Congress uses property in the exercise of
some enumerated power other than the property clause, state law must yield. Id. at 298-300, 304-06.
For example, Congress might use article IV lands for a post office site, Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S.
367 (1875), a military base, Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885), or construc-
tion of a soldier's home, Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899). Although the article I power of
exclusive legislation is not implicated because the lands so used are not purchased with the consent
of the state, see supra note 5, the preemptive capability of the enumerated power exercised precludes
contrary state law. Engdahl, supra note 5, at 304-06. This restriction on the classic theory really is
not an exception to that theory, however, because it does not recognize preemptive capability in the
property clause itself. Id. at 297-300.
Moreover, the classic theorists recognize that a state by its consent may cede to the federal
government greater authority over federal lands than that contained in the property clause. Id. at
304-06. They are willing to recognize this limitation on their theory, however, only insofar as the
article IV lands covered by the consent are used to effectuate some enumerated power other than the
property clause. Id. at 305-06, 315. Thus, the classic theorists perceive consensual expansion of the
property clause power to be merely another version of the obvious limitation on their theory
presented by utilization of article IV lands in the exercise of other enumerated powers. For further
discussion of state consent expanding the property clause power, see infra note 223.
30. Various federal laws govern the written instruments necessary to accomplish the transfer
and the order of competing claims to property. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1718 (1982) (defining Secretary
of Interior's power to convey lands under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982)).
31. See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 296-97; Engdahl, supra note 13, at 79 n.120; Gaetke, supra
note 7, at 385 n.16. For discussion of this exception to the classic theory, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 224-28, 236.
32. Engdahl, supra note 5, at 306-08. For further discussion of this exception to the classic
theory, see infra text accompanying notes 229-35, 237-42.
33. See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 309, 347 n.269. Support for this contention is found in the
cases that upheld virtually unbridled delegations by Congress of its property clause powers at a time
when other congressional delegations were reviewed carefully for sufficient standards. The property
clause delegations merely were reviewed under the principles of agency law applicable to private
proprietors, rather than under the stricter constitutional doctrine. See, eg., United States v. Mid-
west Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); see also Engdahl,
supra note 5, at 309 ("Granting and denying permits for the use of article IV property. . . were




ing pre-constitutional history3 4 and on language in early Supreme Court cases.3 5
It can be demonstrated, however, that neither history nor precedent conclusively
supports the theory.
A. The Historical Foundation
The classic theory originates, according to its proponents, in the landhold-
ing relationship between the American colonies and the British Crown.36 The
colonies were formed through grants of land and governmental authority from
the Crown. 37 Under these grants, the colonies owned and distributed the land
within their boundaries.38 Consequently, when the Revolution severed the colo-
nies' ties with the Crown, the landholding function remained unchanged.39 No
Crown lands were transferred to any American national state as a result of those
hostilities. 40 The new states merely continued the role previously played by the
colonies in regard to land distribution and title.4 1
The significance of these facts to the classic theory rests i the colonists'
attitudes that they reflect. The long history of colonial control of land under-
standably resulted in intense feelings regarding such matters by the colonists and
in their staunch opposition to subsequent assertions of control over their lands
34. Historical context is critical to understanding any provision of the Constitution. Indeed,
Professor Patterson asserts that the "landholding relation [between the federal and state govern-
ments] like every other feature of our constitutional system has its roots in historical soil and can be
understood only on the basis of its historical evolution." Patterson, supra note 1, at 43.
Unfortunately, history frequently is more equivocal than certain. It is necessary, for example,
to make certain assumptions to leap from mere historical fact to the classic property clause theory.
In such a situation, however, the soundness of one's assumptions is as critical to the validity of the
theory as the accuracy of one's view of the historical facts. It is the author's contention that the
classic theorists are subject to criticism for both their views of history and their assumptions regard-
ing it. See infra text accompanying notes 61-82, 118-38.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 139-222; see, eg., Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925);
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Beacon v.
Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896); Fort Leavenworth K.R. Co.
v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885); Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Martin v. Waddell's
Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
36. See, eg., Hardwicke, nlig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 408; Patterson, supra note 1, at 43-
46.
37. P. GATES, supra note 1, at 1, 33, 49; 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 10-12 (T. Cooley ed. 1873); T. WATKINS & C. WATSON, THE LAND No
ONE KNows 19 (1975); Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 408-09; Patterson, supra note
1, at 43.
38. P. GATES, supra note 1, at 35-48; S. LIVERMORE, EARLY AMERICAN LAND COMPANIES
33-36 (1939); Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 408; Patterson, supra note 1, at 43-44.
39. Patterson, supra note 1, at 44-45.
40. Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 413-14; Patterson, supra note 1, at 45, 58. In
the Treaty of Peace, the King acknowledged that the 13 colonies now constituted the United States
and were "free, sovereign and independent States" and agreed to a definition of their peripheral
boundaries. Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, United States-Great Britain, arts. I & II, 8 Stat. 80, 81-
82, T.S. No. 104. The treaty, however, does not purport to grant to the national government of the
United States the lands within that periphery but lying to the west of the settled boundaries of the 13
colonies. Moreover, Congress subsequently rejected an assertion that title to the western lands was
vested in the national government because they had been won by the collective efforts of the 13 states
during the Revolutionary War. See 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 557-59 (1783);
2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at 189-90.
41. Patterson, supra note 1, at 44-46.
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by the British Crown.42 It was equally natural that such attitudes persisted after
the Revolution. State sovereignty on land matters was preferred over control by
the newly evolving national government, 43 which had replaced the British
Crown as the perceived threat to that sovereignty.44
Such state sovereignty over land created a substantial impediment to the
formation of the Confederation. 45 After the Revolution, seven states46 owned
lands beyond their settled boundaries through grants47 and conquests. 4 8 Fear-
ing unfair treatment by a central government dominated by those landed states,
the six states without such western lands, most notably Maryland,4 9 refused to
join the Confederation unless the landed states relinquished their claims to these
lands.50 The eventual compromise offered by Congress called upon the landed
42. Id. at 45-46. In 1763 the King asserted control over the settlement of the Ohio territory,
despite apparently valid grants to certain colonies. P. GATES, supra note 1, at 1; T. WATKINS & C.
WATSON, supra note 37, at 20; Brodie, supra note 2, at 695; Hardwicke, Iilig & Patterson, supra note
2, at 412; Patterson, supra note 1, at 45. The action so disturbed the colonists that it has been said to
be among the major causes of the Revolution. Bodie, supra note 2, at 695; Hardwicke, Illig &
Patterson, supra note 2, at 412; Patterson, supra note 1, at 45.
43. This prevailing attitude of state autonomy regarding land is evidenced by the subsequent
Articles of Confederation, which granted Congress no landholding authority. P. GATES, supra note
1, at 3; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 416; Patterson, supra note 1, at 52-53. The
Articles of Confederation expressly provided that "no state shall be deprived of territory for the
benefit of the United States." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX The Confederation was
granted only one power regarding land. Congress was designated the "last resort on appeal" for
boundary disputes between states. Id.
44. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 45-47, 50.
45. The Articles of Confederation were approved by the Continental Congress and forwarded
to the legislatures of the states for ratification in 1777. See E. Scor, supra note 2, at 31. Ratifica-
tion was not complete until 1781, however, because of a dispute between the states regarding certain
western lands. Id. at 31-32; 1 J. STORY, supra note 37, at 161-62; Brodie, supra note 2, at 695-96.
For a discussion of this dispute and its resolution, see infra text accompanying notes 46-54, 83-107.
46. The seven states were Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Virginia. P. GATES, supra note 1, at 49; T. WATKINS & C. WATSON, supra note
37, at 19 (New York is not included in this list); Brodie, supra note 2, at 695.
47. P. GATES, supra note 1, at 49; T. WATKINS & C. WATSON, supra note 37, at 19; Brodie,
supra note 2, at 695; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 420; Tallman, supra note 2, at 55.
48. During the Revolutionary War, Virginia, at its own expense, had conquered certain por-
tions of the northwest territory claimed by the Crown in 1763. Patterson, supra note 1, at 46. Cer-
tain claims of the states also were based on Indian treaties. Brodie, supra note 2, at 695; Hardwicke,
Ilig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 420; Tallman, supra note 2, at 55.
49. In 1779 the Maryland legislature directed the state's congressional delegates to communi-
cate to that body the state's contentions regarding the western lands:
We are convinced policy and justice require that a country unsettled at the commencement
of this war, claimed by the British crown, and ceded to it by the Treaty of Paris, if wrested
from the common enemy by the blood and treasure of the Thirteen states, should be con-
sidered as a common property subject to be parcelled out by Congress into free, convenient
and independent governments in such manner and at such times as the wisdom of the
assembly shall hereafter direct.
14 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 621-22 (1779).
50. See P. GATES, supra note 1, at 3, 50; 2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at 189-90; T. WATKINS &
C. WATSON, supra note 37, at 21, 24 (including "New York's somewhat vague claims to the lands
under the sway of the Iroquois"); Brodie, supra note 2, at 695; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra
note 2, at 420-21; Patterson, supra note 1, at 46-47; Tallman, supra note 2, at 55-56. The unlanded
states feared that the landed states would dominate the national government if they were permitted
to create daughter states in the western lands. G. DIETZE, THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC ON FED-
ERALISM AND FREE GOVERNMENT 52-53 (1960); P. GATES, supra note 1, at 50; Tallman, supra
note 2, at 55.
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states to cede these western lands to the Confederation.5 1 They then were to be
"disposed of for the common benefit of the United States"52 and "formed into
distinct republican States" 53 that would have "the same rights of sovereignty,
freedom, and independence, as the other states."'54
Two aspects of this compromise are significant to the classic theory. First,
because the cessions of the western lands to the Confederation were conditional
rather than absolute,55 the compromise arguably placed Congress in the position
of a mere trustee of those lands.56 The classic theorists assert that these condi-
tions severely limited congressional discretion and thus negate any notion of
absolute ownership by Congress that might be construed as a source of plenary
power over the western lands. 57 Second, the compromise provided for the ad-
mission of new states to the Confederation on equal terms with the original
states.58 Since the Confederation owned no property within the thirteen original
states,59 the classic theorists assert that this "equal footing" 60 requirement pro-
51. P. GATES, supra note 1, at 50-51; 2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at 190; T. WATKINS & C.
WATSON, supra note 37, at 24-25; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 421; Patterson,
supra note 1, at 47; Tallman, supra note 2, at 56-57.
The compromise was initiated by a resolution of Congress on September 6, 1780, "that it be
earnestly recommended to those states, who have claims on the western country, to pass such laws,
and give their delegates in Congress such powers as may effectively remove the only obstacle to a
final ratification of the articles of confederation." 17 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
807 (1780).
The compromise ultimately was achieved, however, by a subsequent series of congressional and
state actions. Following the congressional resolution of September 6, 1780, recommending the com-
promise, a congressional resolution of October 10, 1780, set forth the terms of the requested cessions.
Id. at 915-16. Another resolution of September 13, 1783, agreed to certain conditions proposed by
the Virginia legislature for the cession of its western lands. Id. at 554-64. The subsequent deeds of
cession from the various landed states to Congress reiterated those terms and conditions. See Deed
of Cession from Virginia-1784, in 2 F. THORPE, FEDERAL & STATE CONSTITUTIONS 957 (1909); see
also Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 421, 422 (noting that Virginia's deed of cession is
"typical" of the deeds given to congress by the land-claiming states); Patterson, supra note 1, at 48-
51 (concluding that the effect of the deeds from the seven land-claiming states was to create a trust
for the benefit of all the states). Finally, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 51 (1787), pur-
portedly embodied and effectuated the scheme of state-building on which the compromise was pre-
mised. See P. GATES, supra note 1, at 72-74; Patterson supra note 1, at 51. For a brief historical
account of the compromise, see Tallman, supra note 2, at 55-60.
Maryland, the last state to ratify the Articles of Confederation, did so on March 1, 1781, the
same day as the first cession by a landed state (New York) under the compromise. 1 J. STORY, supra
note 37, at 162. Congress met for the first time under the Articles of Confederation the next day,
March 2, 1781. 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 223 (1781).




55. The lands were transferred for the purpose of being formed into equal states. The compro-
mise also provided that the ceded lands "shall be disposed of," thus arguably compelling complete
congressional disposal of the lands. Id.
56. Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 422, 423-24; Patterson, supra note 1, at 49-
50.
57. Patterson, supra note 1, at 49-50.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41, 43-44.
60. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 334-43 (1787). The "equal footing" term
comes from section 13 and article V of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 53 (1787), which
ultimately embodied the compromise of 1781. See id.; Patterson, supra note 1, at 51; Tallman, supra
note 2, at 60.
1985]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
hibited the Confederation's retention of ownership of any lands within new
states carved from the western lands. Thus, the cessions by the landed states to
the Confederation are a crucial foundation for the classic theorists' restrictive
view of congressional power under the Constitution.
Three factors, however, suggest caution in basing an interpretation of con-
stitutional powers over federal lands on the cessions under the compromise.
First, the classic theorists arguably are wrong in their interpretation of the terms
of the compromise. Second, the compromise itself was of questionable legal va-
lidity. Third, the terms of the compromise may well have been altered by the
subsequent ratification of the Constitution.
The classic theorists' assertion that the terms of the cessions compelled the
complete disposal of the western lands by Congress and severely restricted con-
gressional discretion regarding those lands is certainly not beyond debate. Con-
gress proposed that the lands ceded to the Confederation under the compromise
"shall be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States,"' 61 thus evi-
dencing a congressional willingness to serve as a type of trustee over the western
lands. Other language used in and deleted from the documents effectuating the
compromise, however, compels the conclusion that much broader discretion was
vested in Congress regarding the ceded lands. For example, the initial congres-
sional recommendation 62 of the compromise called for a "liberal surrender" by
the landed states of their territorial claims.63 This language suggests a broad
relinquishment of state control over those lands. Additionally, the subsequent
resolution of October 10, 1780, as originally proposed, provided that the ceded
lands "shall be granted and disposed of" for the common benefit of the United
States. 4 The "granted and" language was deleted before passage. 65 Since that
legislation arguably would have mandated congressional relinquishment of title
to the ceded lands, its deletion evidences an apparent congressional desire to
retain discretion over such relinquishment. This desire is further evidenced by
subsequent language within the same resolution, stating that "the said lands
shall be granted and settled at such times and under such regulations as shall
hereafter be agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled, or any nine
or more of them."' 66
61. 18 JOURNALS oF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 915 (1780) (congressional resolution of
October 10, 1780).
62. The congressional resolution of September 6, 1780, which initially offered the compromise,
see supra note 51, can only be considered a request or recommendation. By its own language, the
cessions were "earnestly recommended" by Congress. 17 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS 807 (1780). The Supreme Court later so concluded as well. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212, 224 (1845); see also Tallman, supra note 2, at 56 (characterizing the resolution as merely
a recitation of the "advantages to accrue to the union if all the states claiming western lands" should
cede them). Indeed, the Confederation generally lacked any coercive powers and relied upon volun-
tary cooperation from the states to accomplish all its ends. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 52, 57.
63. 17 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 806 (1780) (congressional resolution of
September 6, 1780).
64. 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 915 (1780) (congressional resolution of
October 10, 1780) (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. Id. From the entire resolution of October 10, 1780, therefore, it is apparent that Congress
assigned different meanings to the terms "grant" and "dispose." By "grant" one must assume that
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Such language is inconsistent with any notion of mandatory congressional
disposal of the western lands. 67 Furthermore, the landed states' cessions were
effectuated by deeds that expressly conveyed "all right, title, and claim, as well of
soil as of jurisdiction,"68 consistent with the conditions of the compromise,
which included this broad congressional discretion over the actual transfers of
land.69 Finally, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which incorporated the state-
building scheme envisioned by the compromise,70 provided that the states "shall
never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by the United States in
Congress assembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary for
securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers."' 71 Thus, considerable
discretion was vested in Congress regarding the actual disposal of the western
lands. The only express restriction was that the disposal be made for the "com-
mon benefit of the United States,"' 72 rather than for the advantage of some ex-
isting state.
The classic theorists' further assertion that the equal-footing requirement of
Congress meant actual transfers of title to the lands. Congress apparently intended to exercise broad
discretion over such transfers.
The term "dispose" arguably is much broader in its meaning, referring generally to the use of
the western lands by Congress. This reading of "dispose" is consistent with the now obsolete usage
of the word meaning to regulate, determine, order, or manage. See WEBSTER'S TIIRD NEw INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 654 (1966). It also is consistent with the current usage of
"dispose" as meaning "to apportion or allot (as to particular purposes)." Id.
Under this interpretation of the resolution of October 10, 1780, Congress would be required, as
a condition of the cessions, to use the ceded lands for the common benefit of all the existing states,
thus ensuring that the previously unlanded states would share approximately equally in the benefits
of the western lands. Discretion as to the actual "grants" of such lands, however, was to be left with
Congress, although, as one form of "disposition," such grants necessarily would be required to be for
the common benefit of all the states.
67. See Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion, supra note 3, at 517-18.
68. Deed of Cession from Virginia, 2 F. THORPE, supra note 51, at 957 (emphasis added); see
also Virginia Act of Cession, December 20, 1783, id., at 955-56 (detailing the rights conveyed under
Virginia's Deed of Cession). The deeds of cession from the other landed states used similar lan-
guage. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 49; Tallman, supra note 2, at 57.
69. In response to the congressional resolution of October 10, 1780, the Virginia legislature on
January 2, 1781, offered to cede the state's western lands upon certain additional conditions. See 25
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 559-62 (1783). By its resolution of September 13,
1783, Congress responded to this counteroffer. Id. at 562-64. Congress viewed certain of these
conditions as already provided by the resolution of October 10, 1780. Id. at 562. Thus, it is appar-
ent that Congress, although acceding to some of Virginia's additional conditions, intended that its
earlier statement of the terms of the cessions remain in force, including the provision that Congress
have discretion regarding "grants" of the western lands.
70. P. GATES, supra note 1, at 72-74; Patterson, supra note 1, at 51.
71. 1 Stat. 52 (1787). This language appears to vest broad discretion in Congress regarding
actual grants of land. See P. GATES, supra note 1, at 74; Clark, supra note 3, at 149.
72. 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 915 (1780) (congressional resolution of
October 10, 1780). It might be reasonable, in the exercise of that discretion, for Congress to decide
that the retention of certain lands within a newly created state was for the "common benefit of the
United States." Id. The trust concept inherent in the cessions is a notion common to most natural
resource issues of that time. Ownership of common natural resources was considered an attribute of
sovereignty. That ownership, however, was "to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as
a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of government, as
distinguished from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the
public good." Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896) (state ownership of wild animals); see
also Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842) (state ownership of submerged lands).
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the compromise mandated complete disposal of the western lands 7 3 also is un-
convincing. By demanding the divestiture of the western lands, the unlanded
states sought to avoid a national government dominated by the landed states and
their daughter states that likely would be formed out of the western lands.
7 4
This fear motivated the insertion of the requirement that the ceded lands be
divided into coequal states for admission into the Union.75 The state-building
envisioned by the compromise, therefore, was a critical element of the propo-
sal.76 It is not inconceivable, however, that such state-building could have been
accomplished without complete disposal of the western lands prior to the crea-
tion of the new states. Once a new state had been created, 77 land retained by the
Confederation could have been treated just as any other property within the
state.78 The Confederation, of course, would relinquish to the new state all of
the governmental powers it had been ceded by the landed states beyond those
contained in the Articles of Confederation 79 and thus would retain only those
powers delegated to it by the Articles. The Confederation's ownership of prop-
erty within the new state, therefore, would not reduce that state's sovereignty at
all, even if the original states contained no Confederation-owned property within
their boundaries. 80 Such a reading of the cessions is consistent with the docu-
ments effectuating the compromise and permits the full realization of the ces-
sions' objectives. If the intention of the parties to the compromise was to compel
73. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
74. G. DIErzE, supra note 50, at 52-53; P. GATEs, supra note 1, at 50; Tallman, supra note 2, at
55.
75. It should be noted that the condition mandating the creation of new states from the ceded
lands also insured against the establishment of Confederation "colonies" in the west. See Patterson,
supra note 1, at 49-50. Surely such a fear did not motivate the unlanded states, however, in their
demand of the cessions. It had been their contention that the western lands already belonged to the
Confederation by virtue of the common effort expended in wresting the lands from British control.
See Talhman, supra note 2, at 55-56.
76. The state-building scheme was to be accomplished by encouraging settlement of the western
lands. As eventually incorporated in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, statehood could be achieved
when a territory had 60,000 "free inhabitants," or earlier if "consistent with the general interest of
the confederacy." 1 Stat. 53 (1787). The sale of the western lands also was intended to raise money
to reduce the public debt incurred during the Revolution. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212, 224 (1845).
77. No new states were formed under the Articles of Confederation. Vermont, the first new
state, was admitted in 1791, after ratification of the Constitution. P. GATES, supra note 1, at 56.
78. The new state could exercise its powers over the Confederation's land just as it did over the
other property within its boundaries. The Confederation, therefore, would act in the role of a mere
proprietor regarding its retained land, except for any additional powers delegated to it by the states
through the Articles of Confederation.
79. Prior to the admission of the new state, all of the governmental power was vested by the
cessions in the Confederation because the deeds of cession declared that the grantor states thereby
ceded governmental jurisdiction as well as title to the soil. See Tallman, supra note 2, at 57. The
grant of such governmental power, however, only was to last until the admission of the new state, at
which time all of the governmental powers of the original states were to pass to the new state. See
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 221-23 (1845).
80. There would be a difference between the new states and the original states, namely the
presence of federally owned lands within the former. That difference, however, would not affect the
governmental sovereignty of the new states.
Each state is subject equally to the exercise of the constitutional powers of the federal govern-
ment. The probability of the actual exercise of these powers within a particular state, however, will
depend on a variety of factual circumstances. See infra text accompanying notes 174-81.
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complete congressional disposal of the western lands, as the classic theorists in-
sist, the documents leave that critical matter woefully uncertain.
Even if the classic theorists are accurate in their reading of the terms of the
compromise, the cessions nonetheless are weak authority for interpreting consti-
tutional powers because they were wholly unlawful transactions. Even the most
vigorous proponents of the classic theory8 l recognize that the Confederation had
no authority to assume any land ownership, absolute or conditional.82 Conse-
quently, any legally enforceable requirements presented by the cessions must
have arisen subsequently, presumably under the Constitution.
Finally, even if the restrictive trust concept and equal-footing requirement
of the cessions had been unequivocal and legally binding on the Confederation,
subsequent ratification of the Constitution may have altered their status. The
Constitution, as a grant of governmental authority to the federal government
from the states, may have included the grant of greater federal powers over the
ceded lands than those expressly contained in the original cessions. It is fruitless
to urge a constitutional theory based on the pre-Constitution cessions unless it
can be shown conclusively that the terms of those cessions were left intact by the
Constitution.
The Confederation failed for several reasons,8 3 among them its total lack of
authority to accomplish the state-building envisioned by the western land com-
promise.8 4 The controversy between the landed and unlanded states, therefore,
was not resolved under the Articles of Confederation and reemerged during the
Constitutional Convention.85
81. See, eg., Brodie, supra note 2, at 696; Patterson, supra note 1, at 52-53.
82. See supra note 43. It might well be said that the Confederation's offer of compromise re-
garding the western lands and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, being without authority of law,
were the first efforts to "develop a flexibility in the exercise of Federal power." P. GATES, supra note
1, at 56. Similarly, it has been noted "that the importance, and even justice, of the title to the public
lands, on the part of the federal government, and the additional security which it gave to the Union,
overcame all scrnples of the people, as to its constitutional character." 2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at
191. Justice Story, however, argued that the Confederation's ownership of the western lands after
the cessions may not have been illegal. Id. at 190-91.
83. There were numerous difficulties with the Confederation relating to the insufficient power
vested in the national government. See G. DIETzE, supra note 50, at 50-55. For James Madison's
summary of these shortcomings, see E. ScoTr, supra note 2, at 32-36 and 1 J. STORY, supra note 37,
at 168-75.
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 248 & No. 43, at 290 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); P.
GATES, supra note I, at 51, 72-73; E. SCOTr, supra note 2, at 33; Brodie, supra note 2, at 416, 422
n.74; Harwicke, flig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 416, 422 n.74; Patterson, supra note 1, at 52-53;
Tallman, supra note 2, at 60.
85. At the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the western lands remained contro-
versial for two reasons. First, not all of the landed states had ceded their western lands to the
Confederation in accordance with the compromise. See P. GATEs, supra note 1, at 51-56; Hard-
wicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 422; Patterson, supra note 1, at 54; Tallman, supra note 2,
at 57-60. Maryland and the other unlanded states, having been induced to enter the Confederation
by the assurances contained in the compromise, understandably felt cheated. Patterson, supra note
1, at 54. Maryland's delegation to the Convention, therefore, was intent on resolving this matter in
the Constitution. Id. Second, although the Confederation had accepted cessions of considerable
western lands, see P. GATES, supra note 1, at 51-56, the national government lacked authority to act
in regard to these lands. See supra notes 43, 82. Thus, the western land issue required further
attention at the Constitutional Convention.
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Three primary issues concerning land8 6 confronted the delegates to the
Convention in 1787. First, it was apparent that the national government needed
to control certain lands within the states for purposes of national defense.8 7 Sec-
ond, the experience of the Confederation had demonstrated the necessity of a
mechanism for the creation and admission of new states.88 Last, there was a
need to provide for national regulation of the lands that had, and hopefully in
the future would,8 9 come into the possession of the United States.90
The first issue was resolved by the inclusion in article I of a congressional
power "[to exercise exclusive Legislation" over the seat of the national govern-
ment91 and "like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings .... -92
Although broad congressional power over the seat of government caused little
concern or debate among the delegates, 93 similar authority over lands acquired
within existing states was more controversial. 94 The fear of "exclusive" federal
legislative power being used to "enslave" an existing state caused the delegates
to require state legislative consent as a prerequisite to the acquisition of such
extraordinary federal power. 95
The delegates also gave considerable attention to the second land issue-the
admission of new states.96 The primary point of contention, however, was the
division of large states into smaller states97 and the merger of two or more states
into one. 98 The delegates' concern again reflected a fear of federal action against
86. A fourth land issue concerned the establishment of a seat of government for the federal
government and was resolved in U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 17. See infra text accompanying notes
91-93. Under the Articles of Confederation, even the safety and security of Congress itself were
subject to the wishes of the host state. See 2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at 123.
87. The Confederation depended on the voluntary cooperation of the individual states to
achieve its objectives, including national defense. See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 289 n.12.
88. See supra text accompanying note 84.
89. Certain western lands had not been ceded to the national government at the time of the
Convention. See supra note 85. Thus, more cessions of land were expected under the compromise.
Furthermore, an expansionist attitude already was prevalent among Americans at the time of the
Revolution. See P. GATES, supra note 1, at 75-77. The same attitude was reflected at the Conven-
tion as well. See, eg., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 578-79 (M.
Farrand 2d ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as THE RECORDS].
90. The various acquisitions of land by the United States are discussed in P. GATES, supra note
1, at 75-86.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. This provision provides the constitutional authority for
congressional regulation of the District of Columbia.
92. Id.
93. This portion of the article I clause was approved unanimously at the Convention, virtually
without discussion. See 2 THE RECORDS, supra note 89, at 508-10; 2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at 122.
94. See I THE RECORDS, supra note 89, at 510; see also Brodie, supra note 2, at 697 (discussing
the constitutional debate on this provision). For an account of the adoption of the article I property
clause, see Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 418-19.
95. 2 THE RECORDS, supra note 89, at 510. The insertion of the state-consent requirement
rendered the possibility of such exclusive federal power "unexceptionable." 2 J. STORY, supra note
37, at 126.
96. For a brief account of the Convention's consideration of this issue, see P. GATEs, supra note
1, at 73-74.
97. 2 THE RECORDS, supra note 89, at 461-64.
98. Id. at 465.
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the sanctity of existing states.99 The matter was resolved by requiring the con-
sent of the legislatures of any existing states involved in such division or
merger. 100 In other respects, however, broad discretion on the admission of new
states was vested in Congress. 10 1
The third issue, that of national regulation of lands in possession of the
United States, received little attention at the Convention. After resolving the
matter of the admission of new states, Daniel Carroll, a Maryland delegate,
raised the issue of claims to the western lands.' 0 2 He proposed an express provi-
sion that the Constitution would not affect any claims of the United States or of
the individual states to the western lands. The proposal also provided that dis-
putes over such claims would be resolved by the Supreme Court. 10 3 Gouverneur
Morris, a Pennsylvania delegate, successfully moved postponement of the Car-
roll proposal to allow consideration of a substitute provision which provided
that "[tihe Legislature shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this constitution contained, shall be so constructed
as to prejudice any claims either of the U.S. or of any particular State ... "104
An amendment proposed by Luther Martin, another Maryland delegate, to
specify that such claims be resolved by the Supreme Court was rejected as un-
necessary, 10 5 and the Morris proposal was approved by the Convention with
Maryland dissenting.10 6 The Morris proposal became the article IV property
clause,10 7 almost without debate.
99. Id. at 462.
100. Id. at 464-65.
101. The adopted language provides:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be
formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the
Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures
of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added). The emphasized language indicates that the admis-
sion of new states, except when carved from an existing state or formed by joining two or more
existing states, rests in the broad discretion of Congress. The only apparent limitation on that dis-
cretion is that Congress only has the power to admit "states." Congress may not condition admis-
sion upon the relinquishment to the federal government of some power not otherwise delegated by
the rest of the states through the Constitution. To permit such conditions would allow the admis-
sion to the Union of political organizations with lesser authority and dignity than "states." Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565-68 (1911); see Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 426-27 &
n.88.
Some classic theorists have suggested that the federal government is entitled to retain ownership
and exercise regulatory authority over public lands within the new states only because of state con-
sent that was given as a condition to a state's admission to the Union. See, eg., Hardwicke, Illig &
Patterson, supra note 2, at 427-28. Such an argument, based on a conditional admission, runs
counter to the holding of Coyle. See Clark, supra note 3, at 150 n.40.
102. 2 THE RECORDS, supra note 89, at 465-66. Carroll had raised the same issue earlier. Id. at
461-62.
103. Id. at 465-66.
104. Id. at 466.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. In commenting on the adoption of the article IV language, one classic theorist asserts that
"Maryland, being afraid that her pound of flesh that she had exacted as a basis of accepting the
Articles of Confederation in 1781 might be lost, had made good use of her last opportunity to make
her bargain a matter of the supreme law of the land." Patterson, supra note 1, at 55. Such a conclu-
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The classic theorists make much of the Convention's treatment of the land
issues, particularly the implications arising from the relationship between the
article I and article IV property powers of Congress. The article I clause, ac-
cording to the classic theorists, provides the only constitutional mechanism for
the acquisition of title to lands within existing states by the national govern-
ment.108 They argue that article I evidences the delegates' attitude about federal
landholding within the states by restricting it to a few specified governmental
purposes1 09 and requiring the legislative consent of the state in which the land is
located. 110 Article IV, according to the classic theorists, permits congressional
regulation of the public domain only prior to its division into new states.II1 To
the classic theorists, article IV incorporates the trust concept of federal owner-
ship of the public domain1 12 that they claim existed under the Confederation.11 3
Thus, Congress was required by article IV to dispose of all federal lands con-
tained within a new state upon its admission to the Union. '14 Thereafter, the
federal government could acquire ownership of land within the state only with
the consent of the state and for the limited governmental purposes set forth in
article .11s In the eyes of the classic theorists, the antiimperialistic attitudes of
the colonists about the ownership of land1 16 not only spawned the Revolution,
but survived the ill-fated Confederation and were incorporated into the Consti-
tution by the language of article IV.1 17
sion is curious, however, in light of Maryland's sole dissenting vote to the article IV language. It
appears that the Maryland delegates preferred to grant less discretion over the western lands to
Congress. In Congress the larger, more populous states would have an advantage over the other
states. Carroll's proposal did not mention Congress at all and sought Supreme Court resolution of
disputes over the western territory. 2 THE RECORDS, supra note 89, at 465-66.
108. See Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 419; Patterson, supra note I, at 60-62.
109. The property may be used "for the Erection of Forts, Magazine, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and
other needful Buildings." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
110. Id.
111. Engdahl, supra note 5, at 292-93; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 423-24,
426; Patterson, supra note 1, at 55-57.
112. Professor Patterson asserts that the article IV property clause "constitutionalized the plan
for the building of a Union of States proposed by the [Northwest] Ordinance of 1787 and bound the
nation to its execution." Patterson, supra note 1, at 55.
113. Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 429-30; Patterson, supra note 1, at 55-57.
Professor Patterson bluntly asserts:
If the states had had the slightest notion that the Federal Government could lay claim
to the soil or to its resources or could make great reservations of land within their bounda-
ries or of their mineral resources as a price of their admission into the Union, thus destroy-
ing the equality of states in the Union, the Constitution would never have been ratified.
The fact is that the delegates of the states did not propose such powers, and if they had
been proposed, the Convention would not have approved them.
Id. at 62. See also Sax, supra note 3, at 313. Even if such a speculative contention were proven,
however, it is not preclusive of a broader, modern view of the property clause power. See infra text
accompanying notes 135-38.
114. Patterson, supra note 1, at 61. This contention also has arisen periodically in Congress. See
Tallman, supra note 2, at 78-79.
115. Patterson, supra note 1, at 60-61.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 40-48.
117. This contention is the basis for the classic theorists' argument that the landholding relation-
ship between the British Crown and the American colonies is determinative of the landholding rela-
tionship between the federal government and the states under the Constitution. See Patterson, supra
note 1, at 43-45. Federal retention of article IV lands within states has been labeled a form of
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Although the stark simplicity of this approach is appealing, the classic theo-
rists assume too much in their reading of the article I and article IV property
powers.' 18 Article I provides the mechanism through which the federal govern-
ment may obtain not only title to lands within existing states, but the power of
"exclusive legislation" over those lands as well. 119 The existence of such a
mechanism does not necessarily preclude any other form of federal landholding
within the states. Article I, for example, does not expressly prohibit federal ac-
quisition of lands within existing states through purchase or condemnation with-
out the consent of the state legislature.120 Similarly, article I does not expressly
preclude the use of such property for purposes other than those specified.12 1
"domestic imperialism." Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 431-32; Patterson, supra
note 1, at 45-46.
Some support for the classic theorists' view of the Framers' intent in adopting the articles IV
and I property clauses can be found in Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 530-31
(1885). The Lowe Court, however, noted that this was never the prevailing view. Id. at 530. Since
no article I property was involved in that case, the discussion is dictum. For further discussion of
this case, see infra text accompanying notes 208-20.
118. Some writers have noted that the classic theory is based, in part, upon mere assumptions
regarding the Framers' intent. Coggins, Evans & Lindberg-Johnson, supra note 3, at 570.
119. The extraordinary power of "exclusive legislation" under article I is consistent with and
warranted by the critical importance of the facilities to which the clause applies. As James Madison
noted:
The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them,
require that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State. Nor would it
be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend, to be in any
degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples are here also
obviated by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned in every such establishment.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 289-90 (. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
The extraordinary character of the article I power of "exclusive legislation" also was noted by
the Supreme Court in Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223-24 (1845) (emphasis added):
Within the District of Columbia, and the other places purchased and used for the purposes
above mentioned, the national and municipal powers of government, of every description, are
united in the government of the union. And these are the only cases, within the United
States, in which all the powers of government are united in a single government, except in the
cases. . . of the temporary territorial governments, and there a local government exists.
120. "If the national government owns a fort, arsenal, hospital, or light-house establishment,
over which exclusive jurisdiction has not been acquired by cession of the state, the general jurisdic-
tion of the State is not excluded in regard to the site, but, subject to the rightful exercise of the
powers of the national government, it remains in full force." 2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at 200; see
Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 186, 207-08 ("The mere fact that the Government needs
title to property within the boundaries of a State, which may be acquired irrespective of the consent
of the State. . . does not necessitate the assumption by the Government of the burdens incident to
an exclusive jurisdiction."); see also Laurent, Federal Areas Within the Exterior Boundaries of the
States, 17 TENN. L. REv. 328, 332-33 (1942) (The federal government can decline exclusive jurisdic-
tion over a federal area acquired for a constitutional purpose with a state's consent and leave the area
under the ordinary jurisdiction of the state.).
Although not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, the power of Congress to purchase or
condemn property was affirmed in Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875), in which the statute
authorizing purchase or condemnation of a post office site was held constitutional. State consent to
such acquisition is not necessary. Chappell v. United States, 160 U.S. 499, 509-10 (1896) (condem-
nation for lighthouse site under federal statutory procedures contrary to state procedures upheld).
121. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680-83 (1896) (condemnation for
preservation of battlefield and creation of memorial upheld). Certain classic theorists curiously have
admitted that the federal government may be justified in retaining ownership of lands within states
for purposes other than those listed in the article I clause, see Hardwicke, Ilig & Patterson, supra
note 2, at 431, while nonetheless asserting that such retention violates "the fundamental principles of
the Union and its development in accordance with the principle of federalism," id., and asserting
that it "is in disregard of Constitutional intentions." Id. at 429.
1985]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Certainly nothing in article I prohibits federal retention of ownership of lands
within new states carved from the public domain.1 22 In each of these situations,
the effect of article I is merely to negate the existence of a congressional power of
exclusive legislation over such federal lands within the states.123 The article I
clause, so read, narrowly circumscribes the acquisition of this disquieting con-
gressional power, while leaving unaddressed and unrestricted other forms of fed-
eral property ownership within the states. 124
The classic theorists' view that the article IV property clause power incor-
porates the trust concept of federal ownership is even less convincing. 125 Article
IV contains no hint of a requirement that Congress must dispose of all federal
lands within the boundaries of states admitted from the public domain. 126 In-
deed, the equal-footing concept, upon which the classic theorists premise such a
requirement, was considered and expressly rejected by the delegates. 127 Rather
122. The article I property clause refers only to new acquisitions of property and the power of
exclusive legislation within existing states rather than to property retained by the federal government
after the admission of a state, since the latter category of property is not purchased with the consent
of a state.
123. Rather than possessing the power of "exclusive legislation" over such areas under the arti-
cle I clause, Congress may only utilize its enumerated powers, which include those contained in the
article IV property clause, since the areas are still "property belonging to the United States." U.S.
CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. In other respects, however, "the State jurisdiction still remains complete
and perfect." 2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at 127.
124. Such a reading of the article I clause is consistent with the concerns expressed by the dele-
gates to the Convention. Several delegates feared the federal government's total displacement of
state authority over areas within existing states and they successfully urged the requirement of state
legislative consent to the acquisition of federal power of "exclusive legislation." See supra notes 91-
100 and accompanying text. The delegates probably did not fear such displacement of state author-
ity through nonarticle I acquisition of federal property, presumably for two reasons. First, within
existing states, such acquisitions, as well as the exertion of federal authority over those acquired
lands, would have to be accomplished under the enumerated powers of Congress. Indeed, when the
power to purchase lands for forts, magazines, and other needful buildings was proposed to the Con-
vention, some delegates thought that the provision was unnecessary because the enumerated powers
included such federal actions. 2 THE REcoRDs, supra note 89, at 510. Since the states by ratifying
the Constitution would be granting certain powers to the federal government, it is reasonable to
assume that the delegates foresaw the necessity and likelihood of federal acquisition of property
within existing state boundaries to effectuate those powers. To acquire the extraordinary power of
"exclusive legislation" over such lands, however, the consent of the state legislature was required.
Second, the delegates showed little concern about broad federal authority over new states to be
admitted to the Union. Congress was to determine the terms of their admission and to exercise
broad discretion over federal lands within their retained boundaries.
125. Brodie, supra note 2, at 704.
126. It also is noteworthy that the provision in the Articles of Confederation "that no state shall
be deprived of territory for the benefit of the united states," ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX,
is conspicuously absent from the Constitution.
Certain classic theorists have admitted that federal retention of public domain lands within new
states may be justified. See supra note 121. Professor Patterson, however, has asserted that the
article IV property clause grants Congress the power to dispose, but "not to keep" the federal lands.
Patterson, supra note 1, at 58; see also Brodie, supra note 2, at 721-22 (article IV constitutes a
"mandate" to dispose of the public lands). That assertion is inaccurate. Although article IV grants
the power to dispose, it does not mandate disposal. The mere grant of a power obviously includes
the discretion regarding whether and when to exercise the power. Cf. Light v. United States, 220
U.S. 523, 536 (1911) (article IV power is discretionary).
127. When the matter of the admission of the states was brought before the Convention,
Gouverneur Morris moved to strike the Committee of Detail's proposal that, "[i]f the admission be
consented to, the new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the original States." 2 THn
RECORDS, supra note 89, at 188, 454. The sentence obviously embodied the equal-footing concept.
Morris argued that the Constitution should not "bind down the Legislature to admit Western States
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than embodying the trust theory urged by the classic theorists, the language of
article IV indicates that the delegates instead chose to grant broad congressional
discretion regarding property belonging to the United States. 128 Furthermore,
there is no evidence that property clause legislation was intended to be accorded
a lesser status under the supremacy clause and not given preemptive effect.
12 9
on the terms here stated." Id. at 454. The Morris motion was approved by a nine-to-two vote. Id.
Thus, the Convention clearly rejected the effort to constitutionalize the equal-footing concept. See
Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 427 n.88.
It is difficult, therefore, to understand the contention that the article IV property clause adopts
the equal-footing concept. Some classic theorists nevertheless assert that the equal-footing doctrine
is a constitutional principle, despite its glaring absence in the document itself and despite the une-
quivocal rejection of the doctrine at the Convention. See, ag., Haslam, supra note 3, at 156-57.
Other classic theorists, however, correctly perceive the doctrine to be something less than a constitu-
tional imperative. See, e.g., Hardwicke, Iig & Patterson, supra note 2, at 427 n.88; Patterson, supra
note 1, at 62-69.
To the extent the Constitution includes an equal-footing concept, it relates only to political
equality, not proprietary equality. See Clark, supra note 3, at 150; Hardwicke, Iig & Patterson,
supra note 2, at 424-25 n.83, 427 n.88. But see Patterson, supra note 1, at 62-64 (equal-footing
doctrine not encompassed within Constitution). Each state is deemed to have delegated to the fed-
eral government the same powers and, therefore, retains the same powers.
A statutory equal-footing concept, as embodied in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, was
adopted by Congress in 1789 after the ratification of the Constitution. 1 Stat. 50 (1789) (statute to
provide for the government of the territory northwest of the Ohio River). This enactment made the
equal-footing concept the statutory policy of Congress, but not a constitutional imperative.
128. Certainly the only express constitutional limits on the article IV regulatory power are that
the legislation must be "needful" and "respecting" the federal property. For a discussion of those
limitations, see Gaetke, supra note 7, at 390-98. Unfortunately, little guidance is offered about the
meaning of these limits by the Convention's proceedings. See THE FEDERALLSr No. 43, at 291 (J.
Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("This is a power of very great importance .... )"; see also supra text
accompanying notes 102-07 (discussing Convention's attention to regulation of lands in possession of
the United States).
Regardless of the breadth of the article IV power of Congress regarding federal property within
existing states, that power is not "exclusive" by virtue of article IV alone. The states enjoy general
governmental jurisdiction over the article IV federal lands within their boundaries subject to the
exercise of the federal government's enumerated powers and the operation of the supremacy clause.
As noted by Justice Story:
[m1he power of Congress to regulate the other national property [within existing states]
(unless it has acquired by cession of the States exclusive jurisdiction) is not necessarily
exclusive in all cases. If the national government own a fort, arsenal, hospital, or light-
house establishment, not so ceded, the general jurisdiction of the State is not excluded in
regard to the site, but, subject to the rightful exercise of the powers of the national govern-
ment, it remains in full force.
J. STORY, supra note 37, at 200.
The notion that congressional ownership and regulation of the federal lands are limited by some
trust concept has received limited judicial consideration. See Coggins, Evans & Lindberg-Johnson,
supra note 3, at 619-20; Jawetz, The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law: Ineffective-and Unde-
sirable-Judicial Intervention, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455 (1982); Montgomery, The Public Trust Doctrine
in Public Land Law: Its Application in the Judicial Review of Land Classification Decisions, 8 WIL-
LAMETrE L.J. 135 (1972).
129. The assertion that property clause legislation is somehow inferior to other federal legisla-
tion is a primary claim of the classic theorists. See supra text accompanying notes 25-32. This
assertion is at least based partially on the classic theorists' view that the property clause merely
designates which of the three federal branches is to act as "owner" of the federal lands and thus
grants Congress only proprietary powers. See supra text accompanying notes 4041.
That view is undermined, however, by the placement of the property clause power in article IV.
The property clause is one portion of the so-called "States' Relations Article." Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 379 (1978). That article contains the privileges and immunities
clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, the full faith and credit clause, id. § 1, cl. 1, the guarantee
clause, id. § 4, cl. 1, the provisions for the admission of new states, id. § 3, cl. 1, and other provisions
governing relations among the states and between the states and the federal government. This for-
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Carefully read, the Convention's treatment of the three land issues reflects
mat explains the presence of the property clause power in article IV rather than in article 1. Its
placement in article IV, however, does not necessarily relegate the property clause power to some
inferior, nongovernmental status for preemption purposes.
Surely no language of the Constitution itself supports the assertion that the article IV power is
inferior to other congressional powers. Similar assertions have been made about the article I power
of Congress over federal enclaves. In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), the
Supreme Court rejected that contention. Speaking of the article I power, the Court noted:
Congress is not a local legislature, but exercises this particular power, like all its other
powers, in its high character, as the legislature of the Union. The American people thought
it a necessary power, and they conferred it for their own benefit. Being so conferred, it
carries with it all those incidental powers [including that of the supremacy clause, which
was under discussion], which are necessary to its complete and effectual execution.
Id. at 429 (emphasis added). Further, in reference to the article I power, the Court noted:
This power, like all others which are specified, is conferred on Congress as the legislature of
the Union; for, strip them of that character, and they would not possess it. In no other
character can it be exercised. In legislating for the District, they necessarily preserve the
character of the legislature of the Union; for, it is in that character alone that the constitu-
tion confers on them this power of exclusive legislation. This proposition need not be
enforced.
The 2d clause of the 6th article declares, that "This constitution, and the laws of the
United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the
land."
The clause, which gives exclusive jurisdiction is, unquestionably, a part of the consti-
tution, and, as such, binds all the United States. Those who contend that acts of Congress,
made in pursuance of this power, do not, like acts made in pursuance of other powers, bind
the nation, ought to show some safe and clear rule which shall support this construction, and
prove that an act of Congress, clothed in all the forms which attend other legislative acts, and
passed in virtue of a power conferred on, and exercised by Congress, as the legislature of the
Union, is not a law of the United States, and does not bind them.
Id. at 424-25 (emphasis added). No "safe and clear rule" can be shown why article IV property
clause legislation is of lesser quality than other congressional legislation.
One classic theorist has made an additional argument about the special status of the property
clause power and its general lack of preemptive capability, except in very limited situations. During
the Convention the Committee of Detail proposed the addition of a legislative power:
to provide, as may become necessary, from time to time, for the well managing and secur-
ing the common property and general interests and welfare of the United States in such
manner as shall not interfere with the Governments of individual States in matters which
respect only their internal Police, or for which their individual authorities may be competent.
2 THE RECORDS, supra note 89, at 367 (emphasis added). Professor Engdahl has asserted that the
article IV power "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations" regarding federal
property "was apparently intended to and did cover the same ground as the [above quoted] provision
which had been suggested by the committee of detail . . . for the committee's proposal was not
revived once Morris' proposal [about the article IV power] had been approved." Engdahl, supra
note 5, at 291 n.24. This assertion maintains that the article IV power of Congress, as an alleged
substitute for the committee's proposal, must be limited in the same manner as if the emphasized
language had been adopted expressly by the Convention.
The argument, however, is weak. The language of the article IV power and the committee
proposal are so markedly different that it is unreasonable to conclude that the purpose and meaning
of the two are coextensive. Furthermore, the general tenor of the committee's proposal, as well as
certain of its language, eventually was adopted by the Convention and embodied in the Constitution.
"The Congress shall have Power to. . . provide for the general Welfare of the United States. .... "
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The original proposed draft of the Constitution, however, contained no
similar provision. See 2 THE RECORDS, supra note 89, at 181. Thus, the committee's proposal
apparently was intended to address this perceived deficiency in the general legislative power of Con-
gress and not the question of the western lands. It also must be noted that the above emphasized
language of the committee proposal never was adopted by the Convention.
What Professor Engdahl urges, therefore, is that a portion of the committee proposal, never
adopted expressly or even discussed by the Convention, was incorporated implicitly into another
radically different provision, the article IV property clause. See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 291 n.24.
That assertion is unconvincing.
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two definite underlying themes. One theme is the protection of existing states
from unrestrained interference by the federal government. This theme is evi-
denced by the requirement of legislative consent by affected states both for the
acquisition of the power of exclusive legislation under the article I property
clause 130 and for their division or merger in the formation of new states. 131 The
second theme is a distinct and pronounced preference for broad congressional
power over all other public land matters regardless of its effect on new states.
This theme is evidenced both by the broad discretion vested in Congress over the
admission of new states 132 and by the vaguely limited power of Congress over
federal property in general under article IV.133 The delegates thus showed little
concern for the protection of future states from the same broad congressional
authority that the existing states so greatly feared. 134
There are, therefore, two primary reasons for concluding that the historical
foundation of the classic theory is defective. First, the cessions under the Con-
federation, upon which the classic theorists so heavily rely, are not as restrictive
as the theory's proponents maintain. Second, regardless of the degree of restric-
tions imposed on Congress by those cessions, there is nothing in the actual lan-
guage of the article I and article IV property clauses or in the Convention's
deliberations on the clauses that supports the classic theorists' assertion that a
restrictive congressional trusteeship over the western lands was left intact by the
Constitution. On the contrary, the delegates chose extremely broad language in
stating congressional powers over federal property. Rather than imposing a
130. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 96-101.
132. See supra text accompanying note 101. This congressional power has been described as
"ambiguous." F. DONOVAN, MR. MADISON'S CONSTIUON 69-70 (1965).
133. See supra note 128 and infra text accompanying notes 260-263.
134. Certain delegates to the Convention expressed considerable animosity toward the inhabit-
ants of the western lands. See F. DONOVAN, supra note 132, at 69. In referring to those lands,
Gouverneur Morris stated:
[I]t must be apparent they would not be able to furnish men equally enlightened, to share
in the administration of our common interests. The Busy haunts of men not the remote
wilderness, was [sic] the proper School of political Talents. If the Western people get the
power into their hands they will ruin the Atlantic interests. The Back members are always
most averse to the best measures.
1 THE RECORDS, supra note 89, at 583. Morris later offered the language that became the article IV
property clause. See supra text accompanying notes 102.07.
The question might be raised why the delegates to the Convention did not fear the utilization of
the broad article IV property clause power within their own states. Several reasons are possible.
First, there was at the time no apparent need for large-scale federal acquisition of land within the
existing states other than for the purposes set forth in the article I property clause. See supra text
accompanying notes 87, 91-95. Uses such as national parks or wildlife refuges simply were not
contemplated at that time. Second, even if the federal government decided to pursue a policy of
large-scale acquisition of land within existing states, it would be hampered by the expense of exten-
sive purchases or eminent domain acquisitions. This practical limitation was aggravated by the size-
able national debt left from the Revolutionary War. Third, the delegates may have believed that
large-scale federal land acquisition within existing states would be politically untenable, since the
existing states would dominate Congress for some time and would be alert to such schemes.
Whatever the reasons, it is likely that the delegates perceived little threat to their own estab-
lished states from the broad congressional power set forth in the article IV property clause. Its
primary effect was expected to be felt, and has been felt, in the states carved from the western lands.
It should be noted, however, that the federal government has acquired certain large-scale landhold-
ings in the original 13 states for national parks and wildlife preserves. See infra note 178.
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duty on Congress to dispose of that property, the delegates vested Congress with
broad discretion to do so. Rather than inserting any narrow restrictions on the
objectives of congressional management of the property, the delegates chose to
allow Congress to do what was "needful." Thus, whatever restrictions were im-
posed on Congress by the cessions during the Confederation, the states chose to
relax them considerably by their ratification of the Constitution.
It must be conceded that no delegates could foresee the vast retention of
federal land ownership that has occurred in states subsequently carved from the
public domain.' 35 It even may be conceded that the delegates would have op-
posed such retention if it had been foreseen. 136 What is controlling, however, is
the distribution of power chosen by the delegates and incorporated in the Con-
stitution. The language employed by the Convention certainly permits congres-
sional implementation of the policies of rapid disposal of federal lands 137 and of
the equal-footing doctrine. Both policies subsequently were pursued by Con-
gress. 138 That language, however, does not elevate these policies to constitu-
tional imperatives.
The history urged as the basis for the classic theory, therefore, is less sup-
portive than the theory's proponents would have us believe. A more plausible
and persuasive reading of that history supports a much broader view of congres-
sional authority under the article IV property clause.
. The Case-Law Foundation
The classic theorists rely on more than their interpretation of history to
support their criticism of the Supreme Court's broad view of the property clause
power. They also insist that the Court's current view totally disregards early,
well-settled case law that embraced the classic theory as constitutional doc-
trine.139 Regardless of the deficiencies in the classic theory's historical founda-
135. In 12 western states, at least 29% of the land has been retained in federal ownership. See
Note, The Property Power, supra note 3, at 817 & n.I.
136. For a classic theorist's assertion to this effect, see supra note 113.
137. For a description of the disposal of federal lands, see Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra
note 2, at 428; Tallman, supra note 2, at 67-68; Note, The Property Power, supra note 3, at 818-19;
Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion, supra note 3, at 506-08. See generally T. WATKINS & C. WATSON,
supra note 37, at 45-71 (history of western land system from 1785 to 1841).
138. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 64-66.
139. The most exhaustive presentation of the classic theory's case-law foundation is offered in
Engdahl, supra note 5, at 293-310. Professor Engdahl maintains that the Court's abandonment of
the classic theory is the result of intellectual confusion spawned by a mismatch of counsel: compe-
tent, knowledgeable attorneys on behalf of the federal government sought expansion of the federal
power over federal lands; incompetent, unprepared attorneys on behalf of the private parties and
states sought restriction of that power. Id. at 283-84 n.2, 287, 304 n.89, 314-15 n.142, 329, 339-40,
342-44, 346-48, 351-58; Engdahl, supra note 9, at 1210-11; see also Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion,
supra note 3, at 530 (referring to Engdahl's view that the Supreme Court in Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529 (1976), ignored precedent). One might conclude that Professor Engdahl's indignation .4
is directed at the Court's careless and confused departure from established precedent. In another
context, however, Professor Engdahl applauds certain confusion and "poor analysis" on the part of
the Court when it led to the abandonment of the old federal preemption doctrine that displaced far
more state authority than the modern doctrine. See Engdahl, supra note 13, at 54-55 & n.10. Thus,
there exist grounds for reasonable suspicion that Professor Engdahl is less concerned about judicial
intellectual confusion and departure from established precedents than he is about their resulting
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tion, therefore, it also is imperative to examine its case-law foundation. 14 °
The case-law basis of the classic theory, according to its proponents, 14 1 can
be traced to the 1845 Supreme Court decision in Pollard v. Hagan.142 To under-
stand that decision, however, it is necessary to go back even further to the 1842
case of Martin v. Waddell's Lessee.14 3 The Martin Court considered the owner-
ship of certain lands lying under navigable waters in New Jersey, one of the
thirteen original states. 144 The Court concluded that prior to the Revolution,
the Crown had held title to such submerged lands.1 45 That title, however, was
not absolute in the proprietary sense, but rather was held by the Crown in its
sovereign capacity1 46 as a representative of the people and in trust for them.147
When the Revolution ended, the states, as the representatives of the people, suc-
ceeded to all of the incidents of sovereignty formerly held by the Crown.
148
Thus, the Court held in Martin that the thirteen original states149 owned the
lands lying under the navigable waters within their boundaries as an attribute of
their sovereignty.15 0
effect on states' rights, despite his assertion that he is not a states' rights proponent. See Engdahl,
supra note 9, at 1204.
140. The classic theorists' view of history, this author believes, is unconvincing and does not
compel the conclusion that the classic theory was made a part of the Constituion by the Framers.
This conclusion does not preclude the possibility that the Supreme Court formerly adhered to the
classic theory as the proper constitutional interpretation of the property clause. See infra notes 221-
22 (author's assertion that the Supreme Court never adhered to the theory).
141. See, eg., Brodie, supra note 2, at 710-11, 713; Engdahl, supra note 5, at 293-96.
142. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
143. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
144. The action was one of ejectment for lands lying under the tidal waters of Raritan Bay and
the Raritan River. Id. at 407. The primary subject of dispute was the right to an oyster fishery in
the waters. Id. Plaintiff asserted title through grants running to the initial charters granted by King
Charles II to the Duke of York in 1664 and 1674. Id. Defendant claimed title through state law.
Id. at 408.
145. Id. at 409, 416. Since Magna Carta, the British Crown was deemed to own title to all
navigable waters and the lands lying under them, not as private property, but in a governmental
capacity as a public trust for the benefit of the people. Id. at 410-11. King Charles II, in his charters
of 1664 and 1674, transferred to the Duke of York all proprietary and governmental powers over the
lands that now constitute New Jersey to facilitate the establishment of a colony there. Id. at 407,
411-12. Subsequently, the Duke of York transferred his interest in the lands to 24 proprietors. Id. at
415. In 1702, however, those proprietors surrendered all powers of government to the Crown. Since
title to the lands lying under the navigable waters originally had passed to the Duke of York as an
incident of the powers of government, id. at 413-14, this surrender again vested title to the lands in
question in the Crown, id. at 416, where it remained until the Revolution. Id. at 410, 416.
146. Id. at 415.
147. Id. at 411-13.
148. In the Court's words:
[When the people of New Jersey took possession of the reins of government, and took into
their own hands the powers of sovereignty, the prerogatives and regalities which before
belonged either to the crown or the Parliament, became immediately and rightfully vested
in the state.
Id. at 416. The Court noted: "For when the Revolution took place, the people of each state became
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and
the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the
Constitution to the general government." Id. at 410.
149. The Court noted in its opinion that its conclusion applied not just to New Jersey, but to all
of the original states. Id. at 410-11.
150. Id. at 410, 416. As a result of this conclusion, defendant, as the state's grantee, was held to
have better title to the lands in question than plaintiff, whose title derived from the charters to the
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Pollard v. Hagan15 1 raised the issue whether this principle was applicable to
states other than the original thirteen. The case involved the question of title to
certain lands in Mobile at the time Alabama became a state.15 2 These lands
were regularly submerged by the Mobile River at high tide. Unlike the thirteen
original states, Alabama was not the immediate institutional successor of the
Crown. Instead, a period of federal sovereignty had intervened between the
Crown's rule and the creation of the State.15 3 The contention was made in Pol-
lard, therefore, that the federal government had acquired title to the lands lying
under the navigable waters as an attribute of its sovereignty and had retained
that title even after Alabama was admitted to the Union.15 4 The Supreme Court
disagreed, however, and extended the holding of Martin to states admitted after
the thirteen original states.15 5 The Court reasoned that the federal government's
title to submerged lands was temporary only and in trust for the new states to be
formed in the future.15 6 When Alabama was admitted to the Union, the State
acquired all the attributes of sovereignty possessed by the thirteen original
states, including title to lands lying under navigable waters15 7 as established in
Martin.15 8
Duke of York, but originated in a grant made after the surrender of governmental powers back to
the Crown. Id. at 407-08.
151. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
152. Alabama was admitted to the Union on December 14, 1819. Act of Dec. 14, 1819, ch. 157,
3 Stat. 608. Testimony for defendant established that the lands in question were submerged at high
tide until at least 1822 or 1823. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 220. Pollard was the last of a line of
Supreme Court cases involving questions of title to the same lands. See id. at 230-31 (Catron, J.,
dissenting).
153. Alabama was formed out of lands acquired by the federal government from three sources.
The northernmost 12 to 14 miles of what is now Alabama were ceded to the Confederation by South
Carolina in 1787. See T. DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 68 (1884); Tallman, supra note 2, at
58. The area to the south of this narrow strip and north of latitude 31 degrees was ceded to the
Confederation by Georgia in 1788. Tallman, supra note 2, at 59. The remaining part of Alabama,
that portion south of latitude 31 degrees, arguably came into federal possession under the treaty
effectuating the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. See id. at 61-62. A dispute over the extent of that
acquisition was resolved by the subsequent acquisition of Florida in 1819. Id. at 62. Thus, title to
the public lands in Alabama was held by the federal government at the time of the state's formation
and admission to the Union.
154. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 220-21. Plaintiffs claimed title to the lands in question through
a patent from the United States confirmed by two acts of Congress. Id. at 219. They argued that the
federal government by treaty had obtained title and jurisdiction over the lands to the same extent as
previously held by the King of Spain. Id. at 220, 225. When Alabama was admitted to the Union,
plaintiffs argued, the State agreed to disclaim any right to the waste or unappropriated lands within
the State and further agreed that the navigable waters within the State would remain public high-
ways. Id. at 220-21. Thus, according to plaintiffs, the State had relinquished voluntarily any claim
to the submerged lands as a condition to its admission to the Union. Defendant, on the other hand,
apparently was a mere trespasser in possession of the lands in question. Id. at 232 (Catron, J.,
dissenting).
155. Id. at 228-29.
156. Id. at 221, 223, 224.
157. Id. at 228-30. The Supreme Court has followed this holding consistently in numerous cases
involving title to such lands. See Gaetke, supra note 3, at 162-64.
158. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 229. Plaintiffs' grant from the United States occurred after
Alabama became a state. The United States, therefore, was without title to the submerged lands at
the time of the grant, id. at 229-30, and plaintiffs' title was worthless.
The Court thus rejected plaintiffs' two primary contentions. The first was that the federal
government might obtain greater powers than those enumerated in the Constitution by acquiring
them from a foreign government via a treaty. Id. at 220. The Court concluded that a nation "ac-
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The classic theorists make two primary assertions about Pollard. That case,
they insist, evidences the Court's commitment to the concept of the equal-foot-
ing doctrine, which compelled the Court to extend the holding of Martin to new
states admitted after the original thirteen.15 9 Furthermore, the classic theorists
emphasize that the Court in Pollard expressly recognized a federal power of
exclusive legislation within the states, both old and new, only in regard to article
I property, not article IV property. 160
These assertions of the classic theorists cannot be criticized. Clearly the
holding of Pollard is that, to equate the sovereignty of a new state with that of
the original states, title to lands lying under navigable waters within a new
state's boundaries must be vested in the state upon its admission. 161 Having
concluded that the submerged lands were not federal property, 162 the Court's
further assertion that article IV provides no grant of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion over federal property within a state is relegated to mere dictum. 163 Never-
theless, this dictum cannot be challenged. Indeed, if article IV did provide such
exclusive federal power, it would be difficult to imagine the function of the arti-
cle I property clause power over that more limited category of federal property
used for forts, arsenals, and so on, with the consent of the states.
The conclusion that the classic theorists derive from these assertions, how-
ever, is subject to criticism. They conclude that the Court in Pollard adopted
the classic theory as constitutional doctrine, 164 and emphasize that the Court
established that a new state, upon its admission to the Union, acquires general
governmental jurisdiction over all lands within its boundaries, the federal prop-
erty to the same extent as the private.' 65 Consequently, when Congress merely
acts in respect to federal lands under its article IV powers of disposal and regula-
tion, the classic theorists conclude that Pollard authorizes the states to interfere
quiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the constitution and laws of its own
government, and not according to those of the government ceding it." Id. at 225. Plaintiffs' second
contention was that the State of Alabama, by compact with the federal government, voluntarily had
relinquished title to the submerged lands as a condition of its admission to the Union. Id. at 220-21,
223. The Court concluded, however, that such a compact could not be utilized to diminish the
sovereignty of the new states, id. at 229-30, and that the compact in question did not in fact attempt
to diminish Alabama's sovereignty. Id.
159. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 5, at 294; Note, The Property Power, supra note 3, at 835-37.
160. See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 294-96.
161. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 229-30.
162. Id.
163. The Supreme Court has noted directly that Pollard is not a limit on the article IV power of
Congress. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963); see also Coggins, Evans & Lind-
berg-Johnson, supra note 3, at 572 (Pollard is not controlling in the area of regulation of federal
lands.).
Pollard is a title case. The Court's task was to determine whether, at the time of the federal
grant in question, the submerged lands were federal property, a question answered in the negative by
the trial court's jury instruction. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 220. After concluding that the lands
were not federal property, there was no issue before the Court on the scope of the power of Congress
under article IV. See infra note 180 (discussing the relationship between the title question and the
property clause).
164. Engdahl, supra note 5, at 295-96.
165. Id.
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by their own legislation. 166
This remarkable conclusion is not expressly stated by the Supreme Court in
Pollard, as the classic theorists do and candidly must admit. 167 Rather, they
insist that the conclusion is implicit in the Court's opinion. 168 It is imperative to
note, however, that their conclusion is implicit in Pollard only if the classic theo-
rists' view of the equal-footing doctrine is accepted. According to that view, the
equal-footing doctrine precludes congressional use of a preemptive property
clause power within a new state because no federal public domain lands subject
to such a power existed within the thirteen original states.169 The equal-footing
doctrine can be effectuated, according to the classic theorists, only by adherence
to one of their two basic propositions. Either the federal government must relin-
quish all public domain lands when a new state is admitted to the Union, 170 or
the article IV power over retained public domain lands within a new state must
be viewed as equivalent to the power of any private proprietor over land, a
power subject to overriding state legislation.17 1 The first proposition would en-
sure that the new states are in the same factual situation regarding federal prop-
erty as the original states, since no article IV property would lie in either. 172
The second proposition would allow the federal government to retain article IV
166. See id. at 296, 303. The classic theorists, however, recognize certain exceptions to this
principle. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32; infra text accompanying notes 223-42.
167. Engdahl, supra note 5, at 295.
168. Id.
169. See, eg., Patterson, supra note 1, at 55-57; Note, The Property Power, supra note 3, at 834-
37. The classic theorists appear to define sovereignty in part by its geographic or quantitative reach
rather than its qualitative aspects. See Brodie, supra note 2, at 712.
170. Patterson, supra note 1, at 57. Professor Patterson seems to suggest that such total disposal
of federal lands was universally accepted as mandatory at the time of the cessions and ratification of
the Constitution. Id. at 48-49. At least by the time of Pollard, however, there was legitimate dis-
pute. Justice Catron, in his dissent in that case, noted that the federal government could retain lands
within states. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 232 (Catron, J., dissenting).
171. Engdahl, supra note 5, at 295-96.
172. This more extreme proposition of the classic theorists views the article IV property clause
to be merely a temporary grant of power to Congress. They maintain that Congress may exercise its
authority over public lands only until the new state in which those lands lie is admitted to the Union.
See, eg., Patterson, supra note 1, at 55.
Certain language used by the Court in Pollard lends support to this contention. The Pollard
Court stated:
When Alabama was admitted into the Union, on an equal footing with the original states,
she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which
Georgia possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as this right was diminished by
the public lands remaining in the possession and under the control of the United States, for
the temporary purposes provided for in the deed of cession and the legislative acts con-
nected with it ....
Whenever the United States shall have fully executed these trusts, the municipal sov-
ereignty of the new states will be complete, throughout their respective borders, and they,
and the original states, will be upon an equal footing, in all respects whatever.
Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223-24 (emphasis added). It must be remembered, however, that at the
time of Pollard, total disposal of federal lands still was the policy of the day. That policy was
expressed in a 1789 statute adopting the terms of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, thus statutorily
committing the federal government to such disposition. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50. It
would not be cautious, however, to ascribe constitutional significance to this language since the
Court did not expressly do so. As an expression of constitutional doctrine the language at best is
ambiguous dictum.
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lands within the new states, but would prevent the application of a preemptive
congressional power merely as a result of that federal retention.1 73 Under both
propositions the preemptive exercise of the property clause power within a state
is precluded, thus rendering the original and new states absolutely equal in re-
spect to such power.
The classic theorists, however, ascribe to the equal-footing doctrine a far
broader meaning than is necessary or is warranted by the Pollard decision. As
used by the Pollard Court, the doctrine requires only that the sovereign powers
of new states equal those of the original states. 174 It does not require that the
factual context for the application of federal powers be the same within the
states.17 5 The states differ greatly in the extent to which certain federal powers
actually are used and usable within their boundaries. Some states, for example,
contain vast navigable waters rendering them more susceptible than other states
to the congressional exercise of the commerce clause power.176 Similarly, some
states have greater populations of Indians than others, presenting a greater
probability of congressional use of its power over such persons 177 in the former
than in the latter. Numerous other examples could be listed to illustrate that the
states were not and could never have been intended to be equal in the extent to
which the enumerated powers of the federal government would apply within
173. Of course other enumerated powers of Congress could be exercised preemptively in regard
to the retained public lands. The mere federal ownership of lands within the state, however, would
provide no preemptive article IV power.
174. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 228-29; see also United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950)
("The requirement of equal footing was designed not to wipe out those diversities [in the economic
aspects of the states] but to create parity as respects political standing and sovereignty."); Clark,
supra note 3, at 150 ("mhe powers and rights so reserved to the original states, and vested in the
subsequently admitted states under the 'equal footing' clause, are political and not proprietary in
character."); Coggins, Evans & Lindberg-Johnson, supra note 3, at 575 ("The doctrine was formu-
lated to assure political parity, not economic or geophysical equality.").
175. See Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion, supra note 3, at 522-23. No federal public domain
lands existed within the 13 original states at the time of the ratification of the Constitution. Thus,
the article IV property clause power had no application within those states at that time. The classic
theorists equate this factual situation with the quantum of sovereignty possessed by the original
states. In other words, the classic theorists maintain that the original states must not have given up
any aspect of their sovereignty in regard to federally owned public domain lands because no such
lands existed within those states at the time of the states' ratification of the Constitution. The classic
theorists' view of the equal-footing doctrine, therefore, is based on the unstated premise that the
extent of the 13 original states' sovereignty is determined by the factual applicability of federal pow-
ers within those states at the time of the ratification of the Constitution. See supra note 169.
Another more plausible premise is possible. Although no federal public domain lands existed
within the 13 original states in 1787, those states relinquished to Congress under article IV the power
to dispose of and to regulate lands that were then in the possession of the federal government, all
lying outside of existing states at the time, and any lands that might in the future come into its
possession, which might well include article IV lands acquired within the 13 original states. See
infra note 178. This premise permits full implementation of the equal-footing doctrine since all
states are subject to valid use of the property clause power to the extent it is or becomes factually
applicable within their boundaries.
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The State of Minnesota contains more than 15,000 lakes, most of
them navigable, as well as numerous navigable rivers. It is probable, therefore, that congressional
commerce powers over navigable waters may be exercised to a greater extent in Minnesota than in
some arid states. It cannot be said, however, that Minnesota is less than coequal with those ard
states in terms of sovereignty because its factual circumstances warrant greater application of certain
federal powers.
177. Id. Federal power over Indians is found in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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their boundaries. The mere existence of these differences in the factual applica-
bility of federal power among the states in no way detracts from the degree or
quality of the sovereignty residing in each of the states.178 To the extent each
state has relinquished to the federal government only those powers enumerated
in the Constitution and has retained the remaining attributes of sovereignty,
each state's sovereignty by definition is equal. The Court's use of the equal-
footing doctrine in Pollard merely precludes the relinquishment of any further
powers by new states 179 and ensures that they are "states" possessing all the
attributes of sovereignty enjoyed by the original states.180 That conclusion, of
course, became the rationale of a whole line of subsequent Supreme Court cases
denying Congress the power to condition the admission of a new state on its
relinquishment of powers possessed by existing states. 18 1
The classic theorists fail to provide any convincing justification for ac-
cepting their broad view of the equal-footing doctrine, which is essential to the
178. Each state is subject to the property clause power of Congress. Even the 13 original states,
which contained no article IV property within their established boundaries at the time of the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, were subject to that power. At that time, however, the factual circum-
stances did not exist for the utilization of the power. That is not to say, however, that the
governmental sovereignty of the 13 original states is any greater than that of the western "public
domain" states. When the federal government subsequently obtained article IV lands within those
original states, the factual circumstances then required the utilization of the property clause power
there as well. See, eg., 16 U.S.C. § 459e-1 (1982) (acquisition of lands within New York for creation
of the Fire Island National Seashore); id. § 459f-1 (1982) (acquisition of lands within Maryland and
Virginia for creation of the Assateague Island National Seashore); id. § 459g-l (1982) (acquisition of
lands within North Carolina for creation of the Cape Lookout National Seashore).
179. The Court concluded in Pollard v. Hagan: "Then to Alabama belong the navigable waters,
and soils under them, in controversy in this case, subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitu-
tion to the United States: and no compact that might be made between her and the United States
could diminish or enlarge these rights". Pollard, 44 U.S (3 How.) at 229 (emphasis added).
The Court viewed title to the submerged lands to be a significant aspect of sovereignty that
might be used to the great detriment of a state if vested in the federal government. Id. at 230.
180. Pollard resolves a critical question on the extent of federal title to lands within new states
and is an important property clause case. It decides what is and what is not federal property within
a new state. The case is perhaps more significant, however, as an interpretation of the congressional
power to admit new states. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
There was considerable potential for conflict between the two constitutional provisions. If the
property clause was interpreted to permit a compact that deprived the new state of its title to sub-
merged lands, then the new states admitted under such a compact would be something less than
"states" when compared to the 13 original states. On the other hand, if the power to admit new
states was interpreted to prohibit such compacts, the congressional power to deal with the federal
property under the property clause would be restricted
The Court's decision in Pollard soundly resolved the conflict. It implicitly recognized that
other constitutional provisions place restrictions on the power of Congress to "dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations" respecting federal lands. In summarizing its conclusions the
Court stated:
First, the shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were not granted by the
Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the states respectively. Secondly,
the new states have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the
original states. Thirdly, the right of the United States to the public lands, and the power of
Congress to make all needful rules and regulations for the sale and disposition thereof, con-
ferred no power to grant to the plaintiffs the land in controversy in this case.
Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 230 (emphasis added).
Congress, therefore, must exercise the property clause power consistently with other provisions
of the Constitution. To that extent, the Court in Pollard decided a property clause issue beyond the
mere title question.
181. See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 570-77 (1911).
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inference they wish to draw from Pollard.18 2 Their historical justification based
on the cessions during the Confederation already has been shown to be, if not
totally erroneous, at least open to substantial doubt.183 No reliance can be
placed on the Framers' intent because the record of the Constitutional Conven-
tion clearly indicates that they considered and expressly rejected the very notion
of the equal-footing doctrine as a limit on congressional power to admit new
states.1 84 Finally, there is no hint even in the most casual dictum of Pollard that
the Court intended to ascribe such a broad meaning to the equal-footing doc-
trine. Pollard, therefore, provides a strikingly weak foundation for the argument
that the classic property clause theory once was established constitutional
doctrine.185
The classic theorists offer no better support. Even the post-Pollard cases
182. The Court in three places in Pollard makes statements that arguably lend some support to
the classic theorists' view that the mere federal retention of land within a new state reduces that
state's sovereignty. In discussing the admission of Alabama to the Union, the Court noted:
When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states,
she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which
Georgia possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as this right was diminished by the
public lands remaining in the possession and under the control of the United States, for the
temporary purposes provided for in the deed of cession and the legislative acts connected
with it.
Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223 (emphasis added). The Court also stated:
The right of Alabama and every other new state, to exercise all the powers of government
which belong to, and may be exercised by the original states of the union, must be admit-
ted, and remain unquestioned, except so far as they are temporarily deprived of control over
the public lands.
Id. at 224 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court stated: "Whenever the United States shall have
fully executed these trusts, the municipal sovereignty of the new states will be complete, through their
respective borders, and they and the original states will be on an equal footing, in all respects
whatever." Id. (emphasis added). The emphasized language in each of these quotations may be read
as endorsements of the classic theorists' strict principle that the mere existence of article IV property
within a new state reduces its sovereignty.
Because the Court decided that the lands in question were not federal property, the quoted
language is dictum. It should be noted further, however, that the emphasized language within that
dictum also may be read as carefully avoiding any conclusion by the Court on the principle asserted
by the classic theorists. The Court merely states that new states are equal in sovereignty to the
original states "except so far as" the retention of federal lands reduces that sovereignty, without
declaring that such retention indeed does redtice it.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 61-82, 118-38.
184. See supra text accompanying note 127.
185. There is strong language in Pollard which supports a conclusion that the Court expressly
recognized a preemptive property clause power in Congress. The Court, in discussing the provision
within the act admitting Alabama into the Union whereby the State agreed "[to] disclaim all right
and title to the waste or unappropriated lands lying within the said territory; and that the same shall
be and remain at the sole and entire disposition of the United States," stated that such a provision,
cannot operate as a contract between the parties, but is binding as a law. Full power is
given to Congress "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or
other property of the United States." This authorized the passage of all laws necessary to
secure the rights of the United States to the public lands, and to provide for their sale, and
to protect them from taxation.
And all constitutional laws are binding on the people, in the new states and the old
ones, whether they consent to be bound by them or not. Every constitutional act of Con-
gress is passed by the will of the people of the United States, expressed through their repre-
sentatives, on the subject-matter of the enactment; and when so passed, it becomes the
supreme law of the land, and operates by its own force on the subject-matter, in whatever
state or territory it may happen to be. The proposition, therefore, that such a law cannot
operate upon the subject-matter of its enactment, without the express consent of the people
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they cite fall short of adopting the classic theory. The classic theorists main-
tain 186 that the Court's adoption of their theory in Pollard was reiterated in
1896 in Ward v. Race Horse.18 7 That case involved a treaty between the United
States and a tribe of Indians which had been executed before formation of the
Wyoming Territory. The treaty granted the tribe the right to hunt "upon the
unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be found thereon,
and so long as peace subsists among the whites and Indians on the borders of the
hunting districts."18 8 The issue that the case presented was whether the hunting
rights under the treaty continued after the admission of Wyoming to the
Union. 189 An affirmative conclusion would have deprived the State of the power
to control the taking of game within a substantial portion of its territory. 190 The
Court concluded, however, that the act admitting Wyoming to the Union
showed no congressional intention to continue the Indian hunting rights within
the newly admitted State. 19 1 The Court held, therefore, that the hunting rights
had been terminated by that act.192
There are two primary difficulties in relying on Race Horse to support the
classic property clause theory. First, the property clause power of Congress was
not at issue in the case. Race Horse was a case involving the interpretation of
the treaty power and the power to admit new states.1 93 Second, even if one
wishes to apply by analogy the Court's reasoning in Race Horse to an exercise of
the property clause power, the decision falls far short of enunciating anything
like the classic theory. The Court merely held that Congress had not used its
treaty power to restrict the state's power over the killing of game, leaving unad-
dressed whether Congress could do so.194
of the new state where it may happen to be, contains its own refutation, and requires no
further examination.
Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 224-25 (emphasis added). Since the only congressional power under
discussion at this point in the opinion is the property clause power, it would appear that the Court is
referring to it when discussing the supremacy clause and preemption.
186. See, eg., Engdahl, supra note 5, at 303, 357 n.332.
187. 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
188. Id. at 505.
189. Id. at 507.
190. Id. at 510, 514. Less than three months before its decision in Race Horse the Court had
held that the states owned the wild game within their boundaries as an attribute of their sovereignty.
See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527-28 (1896).
191. See Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 515-16.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 507, 511.
194. Id. at 515-16. The Court noted:
[T]his case involves a question of whether where no reservation exists a State can be
stripped by implication and deduction of an essential attribute of its governmental exist-
ence. Doubtless the rule that treaties should be so construed as to uphold the sanctity of
the public faith ought not to be departed from. But that salutary rule should not be made
an instrument for violating the public faith by destroying the words of a treaty, in order to
imply that it conveyed rights wholly inconsistent with its language and in conflict with an act
of Congress, and also destructive of the rights of one of the States.
Id. at 516 (emphasis added). The Court also stated:
Nor need we stop to consider the argument advanced at bar, that as the United States,
under the authority delegated to it by the Constitution in relation to Indian tribes, has a
right to deal with that subject, therefore it has the power to exempt from the operation of
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The classic theorists also view Kansas v. Colorado195 as indicative of the
Court's adherence to the classic theory. 19 6 That case involved a dispute between
two states regarding the flow of the Arkansas River and its use for reclamation
of arid lands. 197 The United States had intervened to assert that the federal
government possessed the inherent power to resolve this dispute legislatively. 198
The Court rejected this contention, however, concluding that the matter was not
within the enumerated powers of the federal government. 199 One of the consti-
tutional powers claimed by the United States as authority for such federal con-
trol was the property clause power.2°° The Court emphasized that the extensive
power of Congress under that clause did not authorize legislation which "can
override state laws in respect to the general subject of reclamation." '20 1
The classic theorists assert that this language from Kansas v. Colorado evi-
state game laws each particular piece of land, owned by it in private ownership within a
State, for nothing in this case shows that this power has been exerted by Congress. The
enabling act declares that the State of Wyoming is admitted on equal terms with the other
States, and this declaration. . . repels any presumption that in this particular case Congress
intended to admit the State of Wyoming with diminished governmental authority.
Id. at 514-15 (emphasis added). The Court undoubtedly was concerned about a conclusion that
would render Wyoming inferior to the other states in terms of sovereignty. The Court's nearly
contemporaneous decision in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), was clearly in mind. See
supra note 190. The Geer and Race Horse opinions both were written by Justice White. The Court
was able to avoid this troubling issue, however, only by its careful construction of the terms of the
treaty and the act admitting the State to the Union. An assertion that Race Horse is not merely a
case of interpretation of the treaty and statute, see Engdahl, supra note 5, at 303 n.86, 357 n.332,
therefore, is inaccurate. Because of the Court's construction of the treaty and statute, the trouble-
some constitutional issue was avoided.
That issue already had been decided in a related context, however, in The Kansas Indians, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866). The question presented there was whether Kansas could constitutionally
tax lands owned by Indians under patents issued pursuant to certain treaties with the United States.
Id. at 737. The act admitting Kansas into the Union, contrary to that of Wyoming interpreted in
Race Horse, expressly had conditioned admission upon the continuation of the rights of the Indians.
Id. at 754, 756. According to the Court:
While the general government has a superintending care over [the tribe's] interests, and
continues to treat with them as a nation, the State of Kansas is estopped from denying their
title to it. She accepted this status when she accepted the act admitting her into the Union
.... As long as the United States recognizes their national character they are under the
protection of treaties and the laws of Congress, and their property is withdrawn from the
operation of State laws.
Id. at 757; see also The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866) (in accord with a previous
treaty, Court rules State of New York cannot tax the Alleghany.and Cattaraugus Indian reservations
as long as they remain the property of the Seneca Indian nation). Thus, the Court at the time of Race
Horse already had held in other contexts that a state might consent to conditions on its admission if
those conditions were within the enumerated powers of Congress to impose. See also Pollard, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 219, 224-25 (1844) (Consent of newly admitted state to federal power over navigable
waters was constitutional.). It does not seem likely, therefore, that the Court would have hesitated
to hold similarly in Race Horse had it interpreted the treaty and act of admission as imposing such a
condition.
195. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
196. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 5, at 303-04.
197. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 85.
198. Id. at 49, 54-57.
199. Id. at 85-94.
200. Id. at 86-87, 88-89.
201. Id. at 92. The Court's most crucial language regarding the property clause is as follows:
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution within the known and conceded limits
of the United States there were no large tracts of arid land .... [T]he Constitution,
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dences the Court's commitment to the classic theory's primary contention that
the property clause gives Congress no greater power over federal lands than that
possessed by an ordinary proprietor.20 2 Their assertion, however, again reads
too much into the dictum 20 3 of the Court. The Court's discussion of the prop-
erty clause was in response to the contention that the clause implicitly conferred
on Congress the power totally to displace state law concerning the acquisition of
water rights.2° 4 The Court was unwilling to subscribe to such a reading of the
property clause.20 5 The Court's language, however, is not necessarily an adop-
tion of the classic theory. It expressly recognized the congressional power under
the property clause to regulate reclamation of the arid federal lands, both within
territories and new states,20 6 although it expressed no opinion about the preemp-
tive effect of such legislation. Kansas v. Colorado merely rejected the notion that
the property clause inherently vests the federal government with the authority to
dictate to the states the acceptable system of water law.20 7
The Supreme Court case most supportive of the classic theory is Fort Leav-
enworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe.208 At issue was the power of Kansas to tax the
private property of a railroad located within the confines of a military post.209
The post was situated on public domain lands retained by the federal govern-
therefore, makes no provision for a national control of the arid regions or their reclamation
It does not follow from this that the National Government is entirely powerless in
respect to this matter. These arid lands are largely within the Territories, and over them
by virtue of the second paragraph of section 3 of Article IV heretofore quoted, or by virtue
of the power vested in the Government to acquire territory by treaties, Congress has full
power of legislation, subject to no restriction other than those expressly named in the Con-
stitution, and, therefore, it may legislate in respect to all arid lands within their limits. As
to those lands within the limits of the States, at least of the Western States, the National
Government is the most considerable owner and has power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting its property. We do not mean that its legislation
can override state laws in respect to the general subject of reclamation. While arid lands
are to be found, mainly if not only in the Western and newer States, yet the powers of the
National Government within the limits of those States are the same (no greater and no less)
than those within the limits of the original thirteen, and it would be strange if, in the
absence of a definite grant of power, the National Government could enter the territory of
the States along the Atlantic and legislate in respect to improving by irrigation or otherwise
the lands within their borders. Nor do we understand that hitherto Congress has acted in
disregard to this limitation.
Id. at 91-92.
202. Engdahl, supra note 5, at 303-04.
203. The classic theorists recognize that the Court's discussion of the property clause power is
dictum. Id. at 304 n.89. No exercise of the property clause power was under review in that case.
204. The Court, referring to the property clause power, stated:
[C]learly it does not grant to Congress any legislative control over the States, and must, so
far as they are concerned, be limited to authority over the property belonging to the United
States within their limits. Appreciating the force of this, counselfor the Government relies
upon "the doctrine of sovereign and inherent power," adding "I am aware that in advancing
this doctrine I seem to challenge great decisions of the court, and I speak with deference."
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 89 (emphasis added).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 92.
207. Id. at 89, 92.
208. 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
209. Id. at 525.
[Vol. 63
PROPERTY CLA USE
ment after Kansas was admitted to the Union,2 10 and, therefore, was article IV
rather than article I property.211 Thus, the power of the State in relation to
article IV property was directly in controversy. 212 Since no property clause leg-
islation of Congress was at issue in the case, however, the Court's discussion
relating to the classic theory is dictum. Nevertheless, some of that dictum is
quite consistent with the classic theory. The Court noted that within the states
the federal government retains over article IV lands "only the rights of an ordi-
nary proprietor, '2 13 and that the State "could have exercised. . the same au-
thority and jurisdiction which she could have exercised over similar property
held by private parties." 2 14 The inference that the classic theorists would have
us draw from this language is that the Court is professing that state legislation
prevails over property clause legislation as much as over the wishes of private
proprietors. 21 5
It is not clear from the opinion in Lowe, however, that the Court had any-
thing quite so extraordinary in mind. The issue being discussed was the effect of
the state's retention, contained in its purported cession of jurisdiction to the
federal government, of the power to tax private property on the military post.2 16
The Court, therefore, had two issues before it: whether the state's qualified ces-
sion converted the military post into article I property2 17 and, if not, whether
the mere ownership of federal lands precluded the exercise of state powers
210. Id. at 526.
211. Although the lands were used for a fort, one of the uses specified in the article I clause, they
were not purchased with the consent of the state legislature. The lands, therefore, did not qualify as
federal enclaves subject to the "exclusive legislation" of Congress. See supra note 5.
212. Fourteen years after Kansas was admitted to the Union, the state legislature ceded jurisdic-
tion over the military post back to the federal government. Lowe, 114 U.S. at 527-28. In that
cession, however, the State expressly reserved "the right to tax railroad, bridge, and other corpora-
tions, their franchises and property, on said Reservation." Id. at 528. The railroad nevertheless
contended that the cession vested "exclusive legislation" in Congress, id. at 528, 542, and the state
tax consequently was invalid. Id. at 542. The Court disagreed, however, upholding the reservation
of the power to tax. Id. Since the reservation of taxation jurisdiction did not interfere with the use
of the lands for a military post, it preserved the state's power to tax the property described. Id.
213. Id. at 527.
214. Id. The Court also stated:
[Tihe possession of the United States [of article IV lands], unless political jurisdiction be
ceded to them in some other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor. The property in
that case, unless used as a means to carry out the purposes of the government, is subject to
the legislative authority and control of the States equally with the property of private
individuals.
Id. at 531. Similarly, the Court declared: "[WMhen not used as... instrumentalities [for the execu-
tion of its enumerated powers), the legislative power of the State over the places acquired will be as
full and complete as over any other places within her limits." Id. at 539. Furthermore, the Court
viewed the state's cession of jurisdiction over the article IV lands in question to be temporary only:
"It is necessarily temporary, to be exercised only so long as the places continue to be used for the
public purposes for which the property was acquired or reserved from sale. When they cease to be
thus used, the jurisdiction reverts to the State." Id. at 542. The opinion, however, does not discuss
whether the article IV property clause power to regulate the federal lands is one of the "purposes of
government." If the article IV power is of equal stature with the other enumerated powers of Con-
gress, the states' authority over federal lands may be displaced by contrary article IV legislation,
even under the language quoted above.
215. See Brodie, supra note 2, at 710-11; Engdahl, supra note 5, at 298-300.
216. Lowe, 114 U.S. at 526-28.
217. Id. at 528.
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within the boundaries of those lands. 2 18 The Court answered both in the nega-
tive.219 Taken in the factual context of the case, therefore, the Court's language
is not so striking. Certainly the states possess the power to regulate conduct on
federal lands in the absence of any congressional legislation. In such situations
federal lands are no different than private lands, and Congress is a mere proprie-
tor.220 Should Congress use the property clause power in a manner contrary to
the state law, however, quite a different situation is presented. There is no hint
in Lowe that the Court contemplated that situation when it used its broad dic-
turn regarding article IV lands.
The cases cited by the classic theorists are exceedingly weak evidence that
the Supreme Court once was committed to their theory. 221 The classic theorists
are unable to identify a single Supreme Court opinion that incorporates the clas-
sic theory in its holding. This is the most serious shortcoming of the argument
that the classic theory once was established constitutional doctrine and that the
Supreme Court's present broad view of the clause is a break with that doctrine.
Furthermore, even the dicta cited by the classic theorists are ambiguous at best.
Although those dicta certainly are susceptible of interpretations consistent with
218. Id. at 539-42.
219. Id. at 537-38, 542.
220. Id. at 527.
221. The classic theorists point to three other Supreme Court cases as indicating the Court's
prior adherence to the classic theory. See, eg., Engdahl, supra note 9, at 1209 n.45. One is Bacon v.
Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907). In Bacon the Court considered the constitutionality of a state statute
prohibiting the grazing of sheep on another's land within two miles of a dwelling. Id. at 314. The
statute was challenged, however, under the fourteenth amendment, not the property clause, which is
never mentioned in the opinion. The decision, therefore, is at most indicative of the Court's adher-
ence to the principle that state police power legislation applies to conduct on article IV lands. With-
out gross assumptions based on the Court's lack of discussion of the property clause, the case cannot
be read as an endorsement of the classic theory's contention that state law overrides contrary prop-
erty clause legislation. No such issue was raised or discussed.
Similar state legislation was reviewed in Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918). That
legislation outlawed the grazing of sheep on ranges previously occupied by cattle. Id, at 345.
Among other objections, the appellant asserted that the state legislation conflicted with the Unlawful
Inclosures of Public Lands Act of 1885, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066 (1982), enacted by Congress under
the property clause. Omaechevarria, 246 U.S. at 349; see infra note 238 (further discussion of this
statute). The Court disagreed. It concluded that the federal legislation was intended solely to pro-
hibit the assertion of exclusive rights to the use of public lands by fencing or force. Omaechevarria,
246 U.S. at 351. Since the state legislation did not purport to grant a right to use the public lands to
any individual, id. at 352, the Court held that the legislation was not in conflict with the federal
statute. Id. at 351-52. Omaechevarria, therefore, does not reach the classic theorists' contention that
state law supersedes conflicting congressional property clause enactments. The Court found no con-
flict to exist.
The third additional case cited by the classic theorists is Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925).
Colorado challenged the assertion by the superintendant of the Rocky Mountain National Park of
exclusive jurisdiction over the roads within the park. Id. at 229-30. Those roads had been built by
the State and its subdivisions prior to the creation of the park. Id. at 230. The state's bill in equity
alleged that the federal legislation creating the park failed to assert such exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at
231. The Court agreed and concluded that "the rights of the State over the roads are left unaffected
in terms" under the congressional enactments. Id. Thus, the Court apparently agreed with the
state's contention that the federal legislation did not authorize the assertion of such broad authority
by the superintendent. Since the State additionally alleged that it had not ceded such exclusive
jurisdiction to the federal government, id., the Court concluded that the district court erred in dis-
missing the state's bill for want of equity. Id. at 230, 231-32. Because of the Court's conclusion that
the federal legislation did not attempt to displace state authority over the roads, there is no indica-
tion in the opinion on the constitutional result if such an attempt had been made by Congress.
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the classic theory, they are equally susceptible of other less expansive readings.
What the classic theorists fail to offer, however, is a convincing reason for ac-
cepting their broad interpretation of these dicta. What they do offer as their
reason, of course, is their view of the historical setting preceding the cases. 222
Their view of history, however, is itself suspect. Unless one is convinced by their
assertions regarding history, the case-law foundation of the classic theorists fails
as well.
III. THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE CLASSIC THEORY
The classic theorists recognize certain exceptions to their primary assertion
that the property clause grants Congress only those powers of a private proprie-
tor. Those exceptions, however, considerably undermine the persuasiveness of
the theory. First, the reasoning used by the classic theorists to justify the excep-
tions also justifies the Supreme Court's current broad view of the property clause
power, which the classic theorists so strenuously criticize. Second, the excep-
tions, when carefully read, are so extensive in scope that they largely consume
the classic theory.
The classic theorists recognize that congressional exercises of the property
clause power have preemptive effect in two instances.22 3 First, when Congress
222. See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 292-95.
223. The classic theorists also recognize that article IV property might be utilized to effectuate
some other enumerated power of Congress. See supra note 29. Contrary state law must yield to
such federal utilization of article IV property, not because of the property clause power, but because
of the other enumerated power exercised. Id. The classic theorists, it must be remembered, do not
perceive the property clause to be an "enumerated power" of Congress, but rather a mere proprie-
tary power. See supra text accompanying notes 33, 108-17, 169-73.
Moreover, the classic theorists recognize that states may cede further jurisdiction over article
IV property to the federal government. See supra note 29. They insist that this power is limited to
cessions regarding the exercise of some enumerated, nonproperty clause power of Congress. Id. The
Supreme Court, however, has not restricted such cessions in this manner. See Collins v. Yosemite
Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528-30 (1938). The classic theorists maintain that the Court's
approach is a rejection of the established classic theory. See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 324-25.
Some of these state cessions were contained in acts relating to the admission of new states to the
Union. Montana, for example, ceded exclusive jurisdiction over Yellowstone National Park to the
federal government upon its admission. See Act of Feb. 14, 1891, 1891 MoNT. LAWS 262. Such
cessions and their judicial acceptance, see Yellowstone Park Transp. Co. v. Gallatine County, 31
F.2d 644 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 555 (1929), undermine the classic theorists' contention
that superior state jurisdiction over article IV lands is a mandatory component of state sovereignty.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the admission power of Congress under article IV, § 3, cl. 1, as
authorizing the admission only of "states" with all aspects of sovereignty possessed by the 13 origi-
nal states. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 570-77 (1911). If superior state jurisdiction over article
IV lands was a matter of state sovereignty, as urged by the classic theorists, cessions like Montana's
would violate the Court's view of the power of Congress to admit new states. That such cessions are
deemed acceptable underscores and supports the contention that the absence of article IV lands
within the 13 original states did not define their sovereignty in regard to such lands. See supra text
accompanying notes 174-81. Cessions such as that made by Montana did not cede any authority
that the federal government did not already possess, even if not exercised, regarding federal lands.
In this respect, Montana's cession was similar to that contained in the acts admitting the states of
Alabama, discussed in Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 224-25 (1845) (condition regarding
navigable waters within the state), and Kansas, discussed in The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
737, 754-756 (1866) (condition regarding Indian tribes within the state).
Judicial acceptance of cessions such as Montana's also underscores the fact that the property
clause power is indeed an enumerated power of Congress. The cession of jurisdiction by the state
relinquishes nothing more than what was permissible as an exercise of power granted Congress by
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acts merely to control the acquisition of title to article IV lands, the states are
precluded from acting. Second, when Congress legislates to protect article IV
lands from harm, contrary state law must yield.
The Supreme Court held in 1839 that Congress controls the acquisition of
title to federal lands notwithstanding contrary state law.224 That authority is
derived from the property clause power "[to] dispos[e] of" federal lands. 225 The
classic theorists are willing to recognize this preemptive use of the property
clause power, but only as an exception to their theory. 226 A contrary rule, they
reason, would engender considerable inconsistency and confusion. 227 It is not
immediately apparent, however, why a similar concern does not justify a pre-
emptive congressional power to make "all needful Rules and Regulations" re-
specting federal lands. Certainly the variations in state laws on such regulatory
matters could cause considerable confusion as well. No explanation is offered by
the classic theorists, however, to justify this bifurcated constitutional approach
to the powers granted by the property clause.
228
The second exception recognized by the classic theorists pertains to con-
gressional property clause legislation intended to protect federal lands from
harm.229 The leading case upholding this power is Camfield v. United States.2 30
In Camfield the Court upheld property clause legislation that prohibited the use
of fences to enclose federal lands, even though that fencing was erected on pri-
vate lands.231 That legislation directly conflicted with state common law which
the Constitution. A contrary contention renders invalid cessions made by virtually all states admit-
ted at least since 1819. The admission of all states since then has been conditioned on the states'
agreement not to interfere with unappropriated federal lands. If superior state authority over such
land is a matter of state sovereignty, it would appear that such agreements violate the principle of
Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
224. Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 516-17 (1839); Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 436, 450-51 (1839). The Court had indicated this view even earlier, without directly so hold-
ing. See Ross v. Doe ex reL Barland, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 655, 664 (1828).
225. Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 516-17 (1839). Professor Engdahl asserts that this
exception is based solely on language in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the subsequent en-
abling legislation admitting new states into the Union. Engdahl, supra note 9, at 1209 & n.45. The
language prohibited state interference with the disposal of federal lands. In light of the congressional
property clause power "to dispose of" the federal lands, it is not apparent why reliance need be
placed on legislative language to justify broad congressional discretion.
226. See supra note 31; see also Engdahl, supra note 5, at 351-52 (discussing recognition "from
the outset" that federal power over federal lands is an exception to the governmental jurisdiction of
the states).
227. Engdahl, supra note 5, at 296-97.
228. Presumably their view of history and the adoption of the property clause provides the ra-
tionale for this approach. Since the classic theorists are convinced that the Framers intended article
IV to grant Congress only the powers of a private proprietor over federal lands, the recognition of a
preemptive congressional power in the title cases certainly must be a mere exception. The title cases
themselves, however, contain no language supporting this approach. See Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v.
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); Utah Power &
Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917); Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92 (1872);
Irvine v. Marshall, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 558 (1858); Jourdan v. Barrett, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 169 (1846);
Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839); Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 436 (1839);
Ross v. Doe ex rel. Barland, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 655 (1828).
229. Engdahl, supra note 5, at 306-08.
230. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
231. Id. at 525-26.
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permitted the fencing of private lands. 2 32 The classic theorists view the preemp-
tive power of Congress affirmed in Camfield as an exception to their theory that
congressional property clause legislation must yield to contrary state law.
233
Necessity and practicality again seem to be the justification for this exception.
They stress that the preservation of federal lands from destruction and harm is
essential to the maintenance of those lands.234 Thus, according to the classic
theorists, the Camfield exception is a narrow one, applicable only to the necessi-
tous circumstances of physical threats to the land.235 It is not clear, however,
why congressional property clause legislation that is "needful" to protect federal
lands from harm should be given preemptive effect whereas legislation deemed
"needful" for other reasons should not be given such effect. The classic theo-
rists, of course, read the power affrmed in Camfield as narrowly as possible to
maintain as much of their theory as possible. Their practical justification, how-
ever, applies equally to all regulation of federal lands considered "needful" by
Congress.
The reasoning offered by the classic theorists for the exceptions to their
theory undercuts the theory itself. That reasoning applies to other, much
broader uses of the property clause power. No language of the Court expressly
declares these examples of preemptive property clause legislation to be excep-
tions to a general, more restrictive rule. Furthermore, no compelling reason is
offered for inferring such a result from the cases other than that the recognition
of a preemptive property clause power in these instances conflicts with the clas-
sic theorists' basic historical view that the property clause was not intended to
convey such a power. For those unconvinced by the classic theorists' view of
history, however, there is no reason not to apply the rationale for the "excep-
tions" to all exercises of the property clause power.
The true breadth of the exceptions recognized by the classic theorists also
goes far toward undermining their theory by effectively consuming the general
rule. The admitted power of Congress to legislate preemptively regarding the
acquisition of title to federal lands encompasses a significant portion of property
clause legislation. For the first century of this nation's existence, such legislation
appears to be the nearly exclusive use of the property clause power.236
232. Id. at 523. The Court noted that a private proprietor is entitled to construct a fence on his
land. Id. Although the Court discussed certain legislation in other states prohibiting "spite
fences'-excessively high fences intended to annoy neighbors-there is no indication that the fences in
Camfield were such fences. Id. Presumably they were typical range fences built on private property.
See id. at 520-21 (describing the fencing scheme).
233. Engdahl, supra note 5, at 307-08, 316-18.
234. Some classic theorists see the exception as merely the application of the necessary and
proper clause. See, eg., id. at 307-08. It is not immediately apparent, however, why the property
clause power might thus benefit from the necessary and proper clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18,
and not the supremacy clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2, as the classic theorists contend.
235. Engdahl, supra note 5, at 307-08, 316-18.
236. See generally T. WATKINS & C. WATSON, supra note 37, at 45-71 (discussing the history of
the western land system from 1785 to 1841); Tallman, supra note 2, at 67-78. It was only in the late
nineteenth century that federal policy toward the public domain substantially reflected concerns
other than disposition, such as conservation. See id. at 78-81; Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion, supra
note 3, at 506-09.
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Although the classic theorists view this exception as conceptually narrow, as a
practical matter it represents a major limitation on the efficacy of their theory.
Similarly, the exception for protective legislation, when properly perceived,
substantially consumes the remainder of the theory. The classic theorists' read-
ing of Camfield is far too restrictive.237 The statute under review was not in-
tended to protect federal lands from harm, but rather to encourage further
public use of those lands.238 Congress was protecting its policy for the use of
federal lands, not the federal lands themselves.239 Thus, Camfield affirms a
much broader preemptive use of the property clause power than the classic theo-
rists admit.24° When Congress legislates under the property clause to further its
policy for the use of federal lands, Camfield declares that contrary state law
must yield. 24 1 Properly read, the Camfield holding apparently displaces all of
the classic theory not already displaced by the acquisition-of-title exception. 242
The narrow reading of Camfield adopted by the classic theorists preserves their
theory, but is a serious misreading of that case.
The exceptions recognized by the classic theorists are quite detrimental to
the credibility of their theory. In fact, given the underlying rationale and
breadth of the exceptions, one reasonably may ask whether those "exceptions"
do not themselves constitute the real "classic" theory of the property clause.
IV. THE REAL "CLASSIC" THEORY
The Supreme Court's current view of the power vested in Congress by the
237. The classic theorists read Camfield as merely authorizing, under the property clause, legis-
lation that protects federal lands from nuisances arising from conduct on neighboring nonfederal
land. See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 316-17. For a criticism of that narrow reading of Camfield, see
Gaetke, supra note 3, at 170-74; Gaetke, supra note 7, at 395-98.
238. The Unlawful Inclosures of Public Lands Act of 1885,43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066 (1982), was
enacted to secure open access to public lands for pasturage and settlement. It was the congressional
response to a number of fencing schemes that took advantage of the checkerboard land ownership
created by the grants of land to railroads for the construction of the transcontinental railroad. See
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 683-84 (1979); Gaetke, supra note 3, at 169 n.64.
239. See Gaetke, supra note 3, at 170-74; Gaetke, supra note 7, at 395-98. The policy of Con-
gress regarding public lands during the late nineteenth century encouraged virtually unlimited graz-
ing. See Coggins, Evans & Lindberg-Johnson, supra note 3, at 588-89. The Taylor Grazing Act of
1934,43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315v (1982), subsequently restricted such grazing through implementation of
a permit system.
240. This broad holding was relied upon and reiterated in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,
538 (1976). See Note, Expansion of National Power Under the Property Clause: Federal Regulation
of Wildlife, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 181, 186, 190, 192 (1977).
241. The federal legislation prohibiting the fences was held in Camfield to override state com-
mon law regarding the propriety of such fences. Camfield, 167 U.S. at 523, 525. In fact, the holding
in Camfield goes much further. The Court expressly declared that the property clause power
reaches beyond the federal lands to permit prohibition of conduct on nonfederal lands that interferes
with congressional policies for the use of federal lands. Id. at 525; see Gaetke, supra note 3, at 172-
73; Gaetke, supra note 7, at 396-97.
242. Whenever Congress utilizes its property clause power to make "needful" rules and regula-
tions to declare a policy for the use of federal lands, contrary state law must yield. Camfield, 167
U.S. at 525-26. Except when Congress is utilizing its power to "dispose of" federal lands, it is
difficult to conceive of property clause legislation that would not fall within the confines of the
properly read Camfield holding. There remains some question, however, about the extent of that
holding when applied to conduct off of federal lands. See Gaetke, supra note 7, at 392-93, 394-95.
For further discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 260-63.
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property clause is quite broad. The Court's most recent pronouncement 243 on
that power describes it as" 'without limitations' "244 and preemptive of contrary
state law when exercised.245 This view obviously is inconsistent with the classic
theorists' perception that the power is limited to that of a mere proprietor. The
classic theorists would have us conclude that this broad view is an unfortunate
and misguided break with the judicially established classic theory. 24 6 When
carefully examined, however, the classic theorists' arguments fail. Their view of
history, which serves as the underlying premise of their entire theory, is ques-
tionable when compared to the available historical evidence. The case law that
they cite to support their theory never expressly adopts that theory and is sus-
ceptible to a much broader interpretation which is consistent with the Court's
expansive view. Finally, the recognized exceptions to the theory completely un-
dermine its efficacy. What, therefore, is the proper view of the property clause
power? In fact, the Court's expansive view of that power is the real "classic"
theory.
The broad view of the property clause actually was established in the earli-
est cases that considered the provision.2 4 7 Those cases, decided in the early part
of the nineteenth century, involved the power of Congress to determine ques-
tions of title to federal lands under the disposition portion of the property
clause.248 In these first efforts by the Court to interpret the property clause
power, the Court did so quite broadly.249 The Court also declared in these cases
that contrary state law must yield to congressional legislation of this type.2 50
The first Supreme Court cases to consider expressly the property clause
power of Congress outside of the dispositional context were those involving pro-
tective legislation.2 5 1 Significantly, the Court viewed such exercises of the prop-
243. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
244. Id. at 539 (quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)).
245. Id. at 543.
246. The classic theorists' assertion that recent, broad views of the property clause power are
rejections of earlier precedents confuses historical practice with constitutional doctrine. It is true
that Congress largely utilized its article IV powers merely to dispose of the public lands, rather than
to regulate conduct, until the latter part of the nineteenth century. See supra text accompanying
notes 137-38. Thus, the early use of that power was consistent with the classic theory. See Coggins,
Evans & Lindberg-Johnson, supra note 3, at 570-71. This early practice, however, did not establish
the classic theory as constitutional doctrine. In fact, when Congress began utilizing the property
clause power to regulate conduct directly during the latter 1800s, the Supreme Court broadly ap-
proved. See infra text accompanying notes 251-53.
247. Brodie, supra note 2, at 699.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 224-228 (discussing these cases as allegedly constituting
a mere exception to the classic theory).
249. It is from this line of cases that the Court derives its "without limitations" description of
the property clause power. It should be noted that the Court cites only disposition cases for this
proposition in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).
250. See, eg., Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 516-17 (1839); Bagnell v. Broderick, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 436, 450-51 (1839).
251. See, eg., United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S.
518 (1897). "Protective" is meant to include protection of the lands themselves and the policy for
the use of the lands. Alford sustained legislation that outlawed the careless use of fire near federal
lands. Alford, 274 U.S. at 266-67. Thus, the case clearly stands for the proposition that Congress
may legislate under the property clause to protect federal lands from harm. Camfield upheld legisla-
tion that prohibited the construction of fences that enclosed federal lands. Camfield, 167 U.S. at
521-22, 528. Camfield, however, goes beyond the principle of Alford and stands for the proposition
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erty clause power as broadly as it had interpreted enactments under the
dispositional portion of the clause.252
By the early twentieth century, the actual holdings of the Supreme Court
on the power of Congress under the property clause had affirmed the broadest of
discretion regarding both the disposition of federal lands and the regulation of
conduct in respect to them. Furthermore, in both categories of cases the Court
had affirmed the preemptive use of that power to override contrary state law. 253
Thus, the Supreme Court consistently has viewed the property clause power as
similar to any other enumerated power of Congress and never as an inferior
power merely akin to that of a private proprietor.
The real "classic" property clause theory, therefore, as defined by the actual
holdings of Supreme Court cases, can be summarized briefly. In the absence of
congressional property clause legislation, state governmental authority applies to
article IV lands as well as private property within the boundaries of the state.254
When Congress uses its property clause power, however, contrary state law is
displaced.2 55 This conclusion holds whether the property clause power is used
to provide for the disposition of an interest in federal lands, 2 56 to regulate con-
duct to further a policy for the use of those lands, 257 to protect them from
harm,2 58 or to accomplish any other legitimate objective of Congress.25 9
that Congress may regulate conduct under the property clause to further congressional policy for the
use of federal lands. See supra text accompanying notes 23841. Both Alford and Camfield addition-
ally affirm the use of the property clause power to regulate conduct outside of federal lands. Alford,
274 U.S. at 267; Camfield, 167 U.S. at 524-26.
252. The Court deferred to the judgment of Congress on the necessity of the legislation, even
though "needfulness" of the regulation appears to be a constitutional limitation on such uses of the
property clause power. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911); Camfield, 167 U.S. at
525-27. Additionally, such property clause enactments were viewed as constitutionally applicable to
conduct on nonfederal property. Id at 510, 525-27. Furthermore, such property clause enactments
were viewed as displacing contrary state law. In Camfield there apparently was no contrary state
legislation, but the Court described the generally prevailing state common law, which authorized the
sort of fences prohibited by the congressional legislation under review. Id. at 523-24.
253. See Brodie, supra note 2, at 699-700.
254. See, eg., Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907); see also Coggins, Evans & Lindberg-John-
son, supra note 3, at 598-602 (State law applies until preempted by a valid federal statute.). The state
may voluntarily relinquish a portion or all of this authority over article IV lands to the federal
government. See Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 527-29 (1938); supra notes
29, 223 (further discussion of such state cessions of jurisdiction).
255. See, eg., Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928); see also Alfers, Accommodation or
Preemption? State and Federal Control of Private Coal Lands in Wyoming, 12 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 73, 94-97 (1977) (discussing case law on the limits of state police power over federal lands);
Laurent, supra note 120, at 33942 (exercise of state police power must not conflict with federal
jurisdiction and laws); Pillsbury, Law Applicable to National Parks and Other Federal Reservations
Within a State, 22 CAL. L. REv. 152, 153, 155 (1933) (discussing generally the limits on state power
over federal lands); Note, supra note 240, at 190 ('i[here Congress chooses to act, all conflicting
state regulations pertaining to public lands are invalid."); Note, Federal Lands, supra note 3, at 216-
17 (states may prescribe police regulations insofar as these regulations do not conflict with congres-
sional action). The application of this principle to the area of criminal law is discussed in Laurent,
supra note 120, at 341-45, and its application to tax law is discussed id. at 349-52.
256. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); see supra notes 224-228 (cases cited).
257. See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
258. See Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927).
259. See Coggins, Evans & Lindberg-Johnson, supra note 3, at 596-97. Congress may utilize
federal lands to further any exercise of another enumerated power of Congress, as the classic theo-
rists recognize. See supra notes 29, 233. Whether preemption of contrary state law results from the
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The limits on that power are not yet clear.260 No Supreme Court decision
has held a property clause enactment unconstitutional. 26 1 The Supreme Court's
adherence to the assertion that the power is "without limitations, ' 262 however,
seems to answer the inquiry directly. Although that assertion ultimately may
prove to be overly broad,263 limitations on the power are not yet discernible.
Even with its precise limits undefined, the broad view of the property clause
power espoused by the Supreme Court has much to commend it over the classic
theory as sound constitutional doctrine. It is supported by the history preceding
the Constitution and by the records of the Framers' intentions in adopting the
provision. It is expressly enunciated by numerous, undeniable holdings of the
Supreme Court stretching back to the early nineteenth century. Finally, it rep-
resents a coherent and consistent approach to the powers conveyed by the prop-
erty clause rather than a bifurcated and strained theory largely devoured by
doctrinally immense exceptions.
V. CONCLUSION
The classic theorists maintain that the property clause power of Congress
was intended to be essentially the same as the power of a private proprietor.
Their argument is premised on a view of history that is at least subject to sub-
stantial doubt. Their further assertion that the Supreme Court's expansive view
exercise of the property clause power or the other enumerated power in such situations would appear
to be inconsequential.
260. Various terminology has been used by the writers to describe the breadth of the property
clause power. See, eg., Coggins, Evans & Lindberg-Johnson, supra note 3, at 596 ("plenary and
virtually uncontrolled"); Note, supra note 18, at 149 ("virtually limitless"); Note, supra note 271, at
186 ("almost boundless"). When one considers that the Supreme Court has upheld property clause
legislation reaching conduct beyond federal lands, this supposedly unlimited power is particularly
disquieting. Some writers have suggested a limit based on reasonable distances from federal lands.
See Sax, supra note 1, at 265-69. Others have suggested a more flexible approach. See Gaetke, supra
note 7, at 395-402 (offering a balancing approach analogous to that used in nuisance cases); Note,
Federal Protection of Endangered Wildlife Species, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1289, 1297-98 (1970) (offering
a flexible approach based on the precise purpose of the federal regulation imposed).
261. The Supreme Court, however, has not uniformly affirmed all federal action allegedly pre-
mised on the property clause. The Court has found certain federal regulatory efforts to be beyond
the power conferred by Congress. See Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925). Similarly, the Court
has found that the assertion of an easement across private lands to reach public lands was not au-
thorized by Congress. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979). The Court also has
noted that property clause regulation may constitute a taking. See Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86
(1911). Furthermore, the Court has concluded that the property clause does not authorize the total
displacement of state authority over the subject of reclamation. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907). Nevertheless, the Court has not held unconstitutional any legislation of Congress enacted
under its power "to dispose of" federal lands or "to make all needful Rules and Regulations" regard-
ing them. Thus, the limits of the article IV power remain a matter of speculation.
262. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) ("[W]hile the furthest reaches of the
power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly
observed that '[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.' ")
(quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)).
263. The Court's assertion that the property clause power is "without limitations" is too broad
when applied to property clause legislation regulating conduct outside federal lands. See Gaetke,
supra note 7, at 393-95. It seems likely that should Congress broadly use the property clause power
to regulate such conduct because of some tenuous effect on public lands, the Court might find some
limits to the power. See id. at 402 n. 110. A suggested theory for such limits, based on an analogy to
nuisance law, is offered in id. at 395-402.
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of the property clause power is a break with earlier precedent and the Framers'
intent is not supported by case law. Indeed, they are unable to point to a single
Supreme Court holding that adopts their theory. Finally, the recognized excep-
tions to their theory totally undermine the persuasiveness of their contentions.
Even if their theory was convincing, these exceptions leave little, if any, room for
the theory to operate.
The Supreme Court views the property clause power as being much broader
than the powers of a private proprietor and as being preemptive of contrary state
law when exercised. That view is consistent with a justifiable reading of history
and an unbroken line of Supreme Court holdings. Furthermore, the Court's
view more rationally treats the classic theorists' broad exceptions as the rule.
Rather than being a break with the old precedents, the Court's expansive view is
itself the real "classic" property clause theory.
